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Abstract
This dissertation studies how physicians respond to incentives in terms of: their treat-
ment choice, their geographical distribution in the United States, and their effect on
health outcomes. To address this, I exploit micro-data from Medicare at a physician-
procedure level. I then supplement this dataset with novel, granular data collected
from physicians’ directories that follow physicians from their choice of medical school
onward. Chapter 1 introduces the topic and presents an overview of the questions an-
alyzed and results obtained throughout the dissertation. Chapter 2 analyzes primary
care physicians’ response to fee-for-service pricing along the urban/rural divide. In
particular, it first documents that primary care physicians provide more (remunerative)
specialty procedures in less urban areas, where specialists are fewer; secondly, it ana-
lyzes how primary care physicians switch to the more remunerative procedures when
their fees are increased. Chapter 3 develops a model of physicians’ location choices
and uses it to explore the impact of policy changes (loan forgiveness and salary incen-
tives) on the geographical distribution of physicians. Chapter 4 provides evidence on
the impact of the physician workforce on health outcomes by exploiting the policy-set
fees and the micro-data availability.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There is a large literature concerning how physicians respond to incentives. In particular,
there is a large body of work concerning their response to fee-for-service payment systems
(Clemens and Gottlieb 2014, Acemoglu and Finkelstein 2008, Finkelstein 2007, American
Hospital Association 2008, Lori 2009, just to mention a few) and their response to policies
aimed at creating incentives to affect the geographical distribution of physicians (namely,
loan forgiveness and salary incentives). While many papers focus on the effect that such
incentives have on particular procedures (see, for example, Gruber & Owings 1994, Grant
2009, Shrank 2005, Jacobson 2006), there is a need to shed some light on the mechanisms
through which incentives arise and their effect on physicians’ choices and, ultimately, on
the affected American population.
To analyze these topics, I present three chapters in this thesis that address physicians’
responses to different types of incentives and their effect on the choice of treatment, the
geographical distribution of physicians, and their impact on health outcomes. To be able to
fully understand the margins that impact these choices, all of my research has three points
in common across all chapters. First, my thesis keeps in mind the great urban/rural divide
in health care access in the United States. In particular, since about 25% of the American
population lives in medically underserved areas where fewer than 10% of physicians op-
erate, the urban and rural parts of the country would be impacted differently by different
health care reforms. This thesis documents how physicians’ behavior by specialty group
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differs according to the urbanity of the area and exploits these geographical differences in
its identification strategy. Second, my thesis shows that the two main specialty groups,
namely primary care and specialty care, behave quite differently from one another, and the
differences between the two create interesting margins. In particular, my research shows
that primary care physicians behave like specialists in more rural areas, which generates an
interesting financial margin in a fee-for-service payment system. These differences need
to be accounted for when modeling physicians’ geographical location choice as the mix
of procedures carried out by physicians in different places is highly dependent on both the
urbanity of the area and the specialty of the physicians themselves. Finally, these chapters
rely heavily on big micro data. The first dataset comes from Medicare and reports all fee-
for-service reimbursements received by physicians for Medicare Part B. These micro data
shed light on the mix of procedures carried out and the response of physicians to changes
in financial incentives dependent on the procedures themselves. This dataset is then aug-
mented by micro data that I collected from physician directories containing information on
physicians’ education and training from medical school onward. This information is then
linked to public rankings to approximate quality rankings of physicians.
The second chapter provides evidence for a supply-induced demand mechanism that is
compatible with the increasing trend in healthcare spending in the US. Using data on the
Medicare universe of physicians (therefore excluding hospitals) and the BLP (1995) algo-
rithm, controlling for demographic and regional variation, I analyze physicians’ response
to financial incentives. There are many margins through which financial incentives can
arise. The key margin this chapter analyzes is the urbanity level of the area where the
doctor practices. In particular, I focus on primary care physicians’ ability to take on more
specialized, lucrative treatments along the urbanity margin. Primary care physicians see
patients first and face the decision of whether or not to recommend a patient to a specialist.
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The reimbursement rate, therefore, generates a financial incentive which affects the margin
of the primary care doctor passing the procedure along to a specialist versus carrying it
out him/herself. Reduced-form results suggest that primary care doctors react strongly to
increases in the reimbursement units. An increase of one unit in the reimbursement factor
(equal to a salary increase shy of $36) leads to 57 more services provided by primary care
in the more remunerative procedure and a 45% higher chance that they will increase the
number of specialist services provided. Structurally, I find that primary care physicians
are able to take on more specialist services in less urban areas, where they gain higher
market shares due to the lower number of specialists in close proximity. In particular, the
increase in the weight of the primary care physicians’ financial interests in the consumer
utility ranges between 7-15% compared to physicians in large metropolitan areas, at the
expense of specialists. Small metropolitan areas (population>50,000) and very rural areas
(population<10,000) are the most affected. This chapter therefore provides a key insight
to the issue of overutilization by showing that a change in financial incentives also leads
to a reallocation of procedures among the different providers carrying them out. Consider-
ing the primary care physicians’ increase in specialty procedures caused by the increased
financial incentives as overutilization would overlook the fact that this increase comes at
the expense of specialists, as analyzed in this chapter. Therefore, this chapter provides
evidence that it is key to consider two complementing effects caused by fee-for-service: a
reallocation of the procedures carried out from specialists to primary care physicians for
any given total number of procedures, as shown here, and the increase in the number of
total procedures carried out overall without an apparent increase in patients’ health issues,
the latter of which is not analyzed in this thesis.
The third chapter addresses a long-standing challenge in the US health care system,
which is the provision of medical services to rural areas, where 25% of the population
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live, but only fewer than 10% of physicians operate. This chapter develops a model of
physicians’ location choices and uses it to explore the impact of policy changes (loan for-
giveness and salary incentives) on the geographical distribution of physicians. I build a
structural spatial equilibrium model in which physicians are heterogeneous along their spe-
cialty, demographics, and skill. Identification of the parameters of interest is challenged
by the possible correlation between unobserved characteristics of location and wages, as
offered wages are higher where amenities are fewer. To overcome this issue, I collect
micro-level data from physicians’ directories on doctors’ medical school, residency, and
first job choices. This wealth of information and structural methods of demand à la Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) allow me to back up the unobserved characteristics and be
exactly identified. I allow individuals the preference to remain close to their residency lo-
cation and let each medical resident’s job choice set depend on his or her skill. I find that all
residents display a strong retention preference and that primary care physicians in particu-
lar are 3.5 times more likely to pick a job within the same state and 4 times more likely to
pick a job within the same area as their residency. I then use the model to analyze the per-
formance of current policies targeted at bringing physicians to rural areas. I find that 0.5%
more primary care residents and 1.3% more specialists have picked rural areas due to loan
forgiveness alone. Monetary incentives in the form of bonus payments averaging $7,500
are responsible for a further 0.2% increase in primary care physicians and 0.1% increase
in specialists. By retargeting the spending currently used for loan forgiveness to higher
salary incentives for rural employment, I find that almost 6 times more primary care physi-
cians would pick rural areas compared to the effect of loan forgiveness. Since primary care
physicians are the main physician category that currently provides medical care to rural ar-
eas, and since they do not need a particular infrastructure to do so, these results suggest that
policymakers should retarget spending from loan forgiveness to salary incentives and that
offering salary incentives to primary care physicians only would be even more effective.
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The average quality of the physicians attracted under these higher salary incentives is also
better compared to loan forgiveness. Another possible policy intervention suggested by the
high persistence in physicians’ location choices is the use of these monetary incentives to
create rural residencies. Since the residency choice is not directly modeled in this chapter,
this question is outside the scope of this thesis but will be addressed in future work.
The final chapter links the physician workforce with its effect on the population’s health
outcomes. The effect of the physician workforce on health outcomes of the American pop-
ulation is a key, yet still poorly understood relationship. Policy proposals tend to link better
health outcomes with a larger physician workforce, but there is no study that shows a causal
relationship between the physician workforce and the health outcomes of the affected pop-
ulation. This chapter seeks to partially fill this gap by providing a first step toward an
identification strategy for the effect of physicians on health, utilizing both an instrumental
variable strategy with exogenous policy shocks as well as detailed micro-data on procedure
revenue. The link between better health outcomes and a larger physician workforce mainly
rely on two facts. First, mortality is higher in rural than in urban areas, across and within all
age groups and across and within all causes of deaths. Second, physicians are concentrated
in cities, and this is true within and across specialty groups. These facts clearly illustrate
that cities attract both more physicians and healthier people, but whether these two facts
are causally related is not as obvious. There are many variables, in fact, that are correlated
with both the physician concentration and health outcomes which will bias the coefficient
on the physician workforce upward with any regression analysis that does not take this en-
dogeneity into consideration. This chapter implements an instrumental-variable approach
that exploits the great variation in the procedures carried out across and within areas joint
with the changes in the policy-set fees for such procedures for both primary care physicians
and specialists to instrument for the physician concentration. To understand the impact of
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physicians on the mortality rate, the chapter also utilizes an age-race-gender adjusted mor-
tality rate to account for the geographical differences in age, gender, and race across the
population, as not doing so would lead to bias in the coefficients. Results from the IV
estimation indicate that an increase in one more physician per 10,000 saves, on average,
4.5 lives based on an average of 4,484 deaths per 100,000 residents, which is about 1/10 of
the effect usually reported by cross-sectional analyses. The results therefore indicate that
cross-sectional analyses display a large upward bias, which is typical of linear regression
analyses where endogeneity is present.
6
Chapter 2
The Consequences of Medicare Pricing:
An Explanation of Treatment Choice
7
2.1 Introduction
The increase in national health expenditure for the United States, which accounts for 17.8%
of the US GDP (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2015), has captured the in-
terest of academics and non-academics alike for decades. On average, half of physicians’
income is composed of fee-for-service payments. Medicare, the public health insurance for
the elderly, accounts for 20% of total health spending and utilizes a fee-for-service reim-
bursement scheme for the original Medicare Part B. Critics and the media have contended
that fee-for-service generates financial incentives for physicians. For example, case studies
have found supporting evidence that fee-for-service leads to overutilization of procedures
without an underlying reason to be found in patient health conditions (see, i.a., Levin &
Rao 2008). Fee-for-service reimbursements have been increasingly higher for specialty
procedures than for typically primary care procedures. Since the reimbursement does not
depend on who carries out the procedure, but only on the procedure itself, and specialty pro-
cedures are more highly priced than typical primary care procedures, this payment system
generates financial incentives for primary care physicians to substitute to more specialized,
remunerative procedures whenever possible.
There are many margins through which financial incentives can arise. The key margin
this chapter analyzes is the urbanity level of the area where the doctor practices. First, the
chapter documents the novel fact that primary care physicians are able to take up a higher
share of specialty (more remunerative) procedures, the more rural the area, where fewer
specialists practice. Second, this chapter studies how the financial incentives generated
by fee-for-service affect the demand for specialized procedures due to doctors inducing
demand for the more remunerative, specialized procedures. In particular, primary care
physicians see patients first and face the decision of whether or not to recommend a patient
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to a specialist. The reimbursement rate, therefore, generates a financial incentive which
affects the margin of the primary care doctor passing the procedure along to a specialist
versus carrying it out him/herself.
This chapter provides a key insight to the issue of overutilization by showing that a
change in financial incentives also leads to a reallocation of procedures among the different
providers carrying them out. Considering the primary care physicians’ increase in specialty
procedures caused by the increased financial incentives as overutilization would overlook
the fact that this increase comes at the expense of specialists, as analyzed in this chapter.
Therefore, this chapter provides evidence that it is key to consider two complementing ef-
fects caused by fee-for-service: a reallocation of the procedures carried out from specialists
to primary care physicians for any given total number of procedures, as shown here, and the
increase in the number of total procedures carried out overall without an apparent increase
in patients’ health issues, the latter of which is not analyzed in this chapter.
This chapter utilizes micro-data from Medicare for all its estimations. It has been largely
documented that the Medicare reimbursement system largely influences the payment sys-
tem of about 80% of American doctors (Clemens & Gottlieb 2017). If this is indeed the
case, the effect found of this chapter is generalizable to fee-for-service payment schemes
outside of Medicare.
First, this chapter shows a novel data finding that primary care physicians take on more
specialty procedures, the more rural the area. To analyze this fact, I create a specialization
index of procedures using the data on all procedures carried out by all physicians partic-
ipating in Medicare Part B from 2012 to 2015. I then classify procedures based on the
type of physicians who would usually carry them out. Finally, I analyze which physicians
provide procedures which are classified as specialty procedures along the urbanity index.
9
Second, I run reduced-form tests to provide empirical evidence that the number of spe-
cialty procedures carried out by primary care physicians and their probability to carry them
out is affected by changes in the reimbursement amount.
Finally, I turn my attention to the estimation of the demand curve. I set up a structural
random coefficients model of demand for healthcare with a supply-induced mechanism
in which primary care physicians enter the consumer’s utility through the reimbursement
fees set by policy. I estimate this effect using Medicare (Part B) data on physicians reim-
bursements from 2012 through 2015, the demographic variation present in the data, and
the policy-set reimbursement fees. Two challenges are faced. First, in order to identify the
impact of reimbursement, it is crucial to control for demographic and region-wide differ-
ences. Its identification relies on consumers not reacting to the amount of reimbursement
the doctor receives, and this is how the micro-data on Medicare becomes key in the estima-
tion. Since all patients considered are insured by Medicare for the procedures analyzed and
do not have to pay for the entirety of the bill, and since the reimbursement units are based
on the procedure carried out and not on the physician him/herself, patients would not inter-
nalize the reimbursement units in their demand system outside of the physician’s influence
on their decision. Second, similar to the estimation of demand curves in other industries,
the endogeneity of the price paid by patients could lead to a biased estimate of the price co-
efficient. I observe the amount billed by doctors and the amount reimbursed by Medicare,
from which I can impute the price faced by patients. Similarly to a higher-quality prod-
uct in another industry, a provider could be picked more often despite having higher rates
(translating into higher co-pays) due to friendliness, word-of-mouth reputation, or personal
attachments. This would bias the price coefficient upward, indicating a lower elasticity of
patients to prices, when instead the choice of the higher-rate physician would be due to
factors that are unobserved by the econometrician. To tackle this issue, I use instrumental
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variables which represent input costs. These costs would increase a physician’s pricing
menu but not be observed or considered by patients, which is the identifying assumption
necessary for the instruments to work. The instruments I use are malpractice insurance
reimbursement fees as a proxy for malpractice insurance and cost-of-living adjustments
for work, practice expenses, and malpractice insurance to proxy for regional variation in
input costs. In the specifications that account for additional heterogeneity, I supplement
these instruments with functions of the same instruments, as common in the literature: the
interaction term of the work geographical adjustment factor with the practice expense geo-
graphical adjustment factor, the square of the work geographical adjustment factor, and the
square of malpractice reimbursement units.
The results from this chapter show that primary care physicians indeed increase their
share in specialty procedures more, the more lucrative they become, and are able to do
so more, the more rural the area they practice in. The analysis of this chapter focuses on
treatments carried out by specialists 60-80% of the time (and by primary care the remaining
20-40% of the times). Robustness checks, available in the online appendix, show that the
results are robust independently of the range chosen, but their effect is stronger for tighter
ranges. From the reduced-form results, I find that an increase in one unit of reimbursement
for a given procedure, equal to an increase in reimbursement of about $36, leads to 57 more
services carried out in that procedure and over a 45% higher probability of primary care
physicians providing a higher number of the more lucrative procedure. Structurally, I find
that the same $36 reimbursement increase for a given procedure leads to an increase in the
primary care physician share in that specialty procedure by 7-15% more in less urban areas
compared to their most urban counterparts, at the expense of specialists. I find that small
metropolitan areas (with a population between 50,000 and 250,000 people) and very rural
areas (with a population smaller than 10,000 people) are the most affected.
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The rest of the chapter is structured in the following way: Section 2.2 reviews the existing
literature. Section 2.3 introduces the data used in the chapter. Section 2.4 introduces the
model. Section 2.5 provides the Reader with some introductory data analysis. Section
2.6 discusses the empirical evidence and reduced-form results. Section 2.7 presents the
structural results and discusses the key parameters. Section 2.8 concludes and discusses
future research.
2.2 Literature
This chapter primarily contributes to the strand of health economics literature discussing
how physicians respond to financial incentives. Papers and articles have documented an
increase in the demand for health goods coming from consumers and an increase in de-
fensive medicine, i.e., doctors’ decision to request treatments and procedures out of fear of
being sued. Nevertheless, defensive medicine has been shown to only account for 0.46% of
health spending (Anderson et al. 2005). Consumers, on the other hand, might indeed enjoy
a higher consumption of health goods, but it would be puzzling if the entirety of spending
was a direct effect of consumer preferences. First, it would be difficult to imagine that US
consumers, who face higher co-pays than Europeans, were so intrinsically different in their
preferences that their utility maximization would lead to higher consumption of more ex-
pensive health goods without any visible health effects. Second and most importantly, this
would mean that US consumers switched their preferences quite dramatically, since this
unbounded increase in health spending is quite recent. The other main school of thought
suggests that the increase in medical spending can be explained by the rise in income since
medical spending is a luxury good (Hall and Jones 2007). However, the assumption that
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medical spending is a luxury good is inconsistent with micro estimates showing that the
income elasticity of medical spending is about 0.7 (Acemoglu et al. 2013).
A recent paper that addresses the incentives generated by fee-for-service is Clemens
and Gottlieb (2014). Their analysis uses a 1997 change in Medicare geographical areas
and focuses on two main procedures: MRIs and procedures for cardiac patients, such as
cataract surgeries. They find that a 2% increase in payment rates leads to a 3% increase in
care provision and that elective procedures respond more strongly than non-discretionary
services. This chapter complements their analysis along several dimensions. Firstly, it is
able to make more general statements on the reimbursement effect on treatment, without
focusing on few case studies, but utilizing both the annual changes in reimbursement rates
and the differences in the urbanity of the areas. Secondly, it documents and analyzes how
primary care physicians specifically are able to increase the procedures they provide ac-
cording not only to the reimbursement level, but to the urbanity level of the area where they
practice, leading to a reallocation of specialty procedures from specialists to primary care
physicians.
Finally, the use of a structural approach to analyze this issue modeling a supply-distorted
demand system is novel on its own.
An extensive branch of literature has been written analyzing, from a reduced-form per-
spective, physicians’ response to financial incentives in a hospital setting (i.a. Acemoglu
and Finkelstein 2008, Finkelstein 2007, American Hospital Association 2008) and in a
managed care setting (i.a. Lori 2009). However, the analysis of physicians’ responses in
their own practices seems to have been overlooked, even though the level and growth of
healthcare spending for physicians is not negligible, as shown in Figure 2.1.
There are also different papers analyzing physicians’ response to financial incentives
13
Figure 2.1: Aggregate Health Expenditure by Type of Care, $Bn
Notes: This figure shows the level of aggregate health spending differentiating between hospital care and
physician-only care. Source: CMS.
for particular procedures (see, i.a., Gruber & Owings 1994, Grant 2009, Shrank 2005,
Jacobson 2006). This chapter complements this strand of literature by setting up a structural
model to physicians’ behavior which is not confined to a few procedures as specific case
studies, but generalizes this analysis by focusing on how the treatment picked is inherently
tied to the profitability of the treatment itself and on the physician’s location.
Papers have also been extensively written on the fee-for-service system’s impact on
health care costs and service overutilization (see, i.a. Ginsburg 2011, Hoangmai and Gins-
burg 2007, Levin & Rao 2004). This chapter complements this literature by providing
evidence that a change in financial incentives also leads to a reallocation in the providers
carrying out the same procedures. Considering the primary care physicians’ increase in
specialty procedures caused by the increased financial incentives as overutilization would
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overlook the fact that this increase comes at the expense of specialists, as analyzed in this
chapter. Therefore, this chapter provides evidence that it is key to consider two comple-
menting effects caused by fee-for-service: a reallocation in the procedures carried out by
each specialty for a given total number of procedures, and the increase in the number of
total procedures carried out overall without an apparent increase in patients’ health issues,
the latter of which is not analyzed in this chapter.
Finally, the evidence of regional variations in Medicare spending has also been men-
tioned, not only in the literature, but also in the media (Gawande 2007 is probably the
predominant example among many) and in the medical literature (see Fisher 2003 for ex-
ample). This chapter makes an important contribution in this regard by providing a reason
for such variation, i.e. primary care physicians’ ability to respond to financial incentives in
less urban areas more than their most urban counterparts.
Methodologically, this chapter bases itself mostly on Berry, Levinsohn, Pakes (1995,
hereafter: BLP). The Medicare database does not actually provide data on the single pa-
tients, but it provides cumulative data on the patients seen by each doctor for each procedure
carried out (some demographics, such as race, as well as many health variables, such as the
number of people with cancer). This allows for a simulation of individuals that match the
observed characteristic distributions in the data.
Readers who are interested in a deeper discussion on the institutional framework should
refer to the Appendix Section A.8.
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2.3 Data
The primary source of data for this chapter comes from the Centers for Medicare & Med-
icaid Services (CMS). The Physician and Other Supplier Public data provides information
on services and procedures provided to Medicare beneficiaries by physicians. It contains
information on utilization, actual Medicare reimbursement, and submitted charges. Each
line of the dataset is indexed by a National Provider Identifier (NPI), which identifies each
doctor in the dataset, by a Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) code,
which identifies every procedure carried out by each doctor, and by the place of service,
indicating whether the procedures were carried out in a facility setting or not. The data
is based on information from CMS administrative claims data for Medicare beneficiaries
enrolled in the fee-for-service program. The data are available for calendar years 2012
through 2015 and contain the universe of physicians taking part in Medicare Part B for the
fee-for-service population. There are a little over 26.3 million observations in the dataset
across over a million of physicians.
Despite the wealth of information on payment and utilization for Medicare Part B ser-
vices, the dataset has a number of limitations. The data may not be representative of a
physician’s entire practice as it only includes information on Medicare fee-for-service ben-
eficiaries. However, since Medicare influences the payment system of 80% of physicians
(Clemens & Gottlieb 2017), this data allows for the analysis of physicians’ behavior un-
der this payment mechanism, which is then relevant for the greatest majority of doctors in
the country. In addition, the data are not intended to indicate the quality of care provided
and are not risk-adjusted to account for differences in underlying severity of disease of pa-
tient populations. To counter this, demographic data on patients’ riskiness and incidence
of diseases will be included in the estimation. Despite these limitations, some positive
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characteristics should be highlighted. First of all, the fact that all beneficiaries are covered
by Medicare eliminates the issues related to the status of insurance of the beneficiaries.
In particular, it allows me to abstract from other endogenous characteristics related to the
insurance status of beneficiaries which would arise if a full dataset (not Medicare only)
were used. Moreover, it also allows me to ignore the network effects of different insurance
policies as well as their different payment plans. In practice, therefore, this dataset pro-
vides a more homogenous universe of insured individuals who receive different treatments
according to the condition that they have.
As far as the illness and disease distribution is concerned, average beneficiary risk scores
are provided on the “Medicare Physician and Other Supplier Aggregate Table” (i.e., one
record per NPI) to provide information on the health status of the beneficiaries the providers
serve for every year of interest together with the rate of incidence of a number of diseases
and illnesses among the patients seen by each physician for every year. Therefore, this can
account for the average health of the patients visited by each physician.
Finally, the Metropolitan Statistical Area definition follows the U.S. Census Bureau def-
inition for Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSA). The urban/rural classification
also follows the U.S. Census Bureau definition according to the 2010 Census criteria. In
particular, an urbanity index equal to: 1 indicates a large central metro, i.e. counties in
MSAs with a population equal to or greater than 1 million that contain the entire popula-
tion of the largest principal city of the MSA, or at least 250,000 inhabitants of any principal
city of the MSA; 2 indicates a large fringe metro, i.e. counties in MSAs with a population
equal to or greater than 1 million that do not qualify as large central metros; 3 indicates a
medium metro, i.e. counties in MSAs with a population equal to or greater than 250,000
but strictly smaller than 1 million; 4 indicates a small metro, i.e. counties in MSAs with a
population equal to or greater than 50,000 but strictly smaller than 250,000; 5 indicates a
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micropolitan area, i.e. counties in micropolitan statistical areas with a population equal to
or greater than 10,000 but strictly smaller than 50,000; and 6 indicates a noncore area, i.e.
the most rural classification, with a population that is strictly smaller than 10,000.
2.4 Model
This section models the ability of primary care physicians to gain an increasing share in
specialty procedures along the urbanity index, at the expense of specialists. In particular,
primary care physicians positively reach to increases in remuneration of a given procedure
by increasing the number of times they carry that procedure out instead of referring it to
specialists, and are able to do so more, the more rural the area. This section presents a
structural random coefficients model with a supply-induced demand mechanism generated
by the physician’s utility for reimbursements entering the consumer’s utility. The Appendix
Section A.9 presents the model setup for the standard multinomial logit model of demand,
which is a particular case of the model described here, where stochastic and demographic
coefficients are not included. The main difference between the logit demand and the full
structural model introduced here is that the marginal utilities of the product characteristics
implied by the full model are different across consumers, and determined by the consumer
characteristics. This breaks the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property typi-
cal of logit models, from which the simplified model in the Appendix would suffer.
I consider the choice of going to a specialist as the outside option. I assume that at this
stage, the doctor has already decided what treatments to offer and the patients already know
what treatment they need to receive. Therefore, consumers are faced with a product choice
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given by the type of doctor performing a relevant procedure for them.
Consumers’ utility is composed of a mean utility and random stochastic coefficients
dependent on demographic variables. I assume that the consumer maximizes a weighted
sum of utilities, her own and her primary care doctor’s, where the doctor’s utility only
enters the patient’s utility in terms of the reimbursement obtained for the procedure carried
out, i.e.

ui jt = max j
{
∑6urban=1 (1− γurban)upatienti jt + IPC∑6urban=1 γurbanuPCjt
}
uPCjt = RVU jt ∀ procedure codes
IPC = 1 if physician is in primary care (PC)
(1)
upatienti jt identifies the consumer/patient’s utility while u
PC
jt identifies the doctor’s utility. I
define each market t as a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)-year combination. Once the
data is cleaned and markets with a single choice are excluded, I am left with 193 MSAs
and a total of 764 markets (almost all MSAs are present for all 4 years of interest). Data are
available for four consecutive years: 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015. Only primary care physicians
are able to influence the consumers’ utility, due to the fact that primary care physicians see
the patient first and can choose to carry out the specialty procedure themselves instead of re-
ferring the patient to a specialist.1 Therefore, IPC = 0 eliminates the supply-driven demand
1This assumption assumes away the possibility of patients referring themselves directly to a specialist. This
would be the case in cities more than elsewhere, as specialists are more present in metro areas. This could
partially explain the initial higher shares of more rural primary care physicians in specialty procedures
compared to their urban counterparts. This initial differential would then be included in what I refer to as
the “competition” coming from specialists in cities. In other words, primary care physicians in cities would
initially carry out fewer EKGs, for example, both because more patients would go to cardiologists directly,
and because out of those patients that would see a primary care physician first, a higher percentage would
ask for a referral to a specialist even if offered an EKG by the primary care physician. However, the use of
the time variation where the reimbursement increase is the mechanism that leads to a widening of this initial
differential, with rural primary care physicians gaining a higher share of their urban counterparts. Therefore,
even if patients could be part of the reason of why, at the beginning of the period, primary care physicians
are able to do more specialty procedures in more rural areas, they would not choose whether or not to refer
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mechanism. The extent to which physicians respond to the reimbursements depends on the
urbanity (this is why γurban depends on the urbanity). The urbanity index is defined by the
Census according to the population of an area and proximity to an MSA. It ranges from 1
to 6, where a higher value indicates a more rural area. In practice, I will report estimates
for γurban for physicians in less urban areas compared to their most urban counterparts, i.e.
physicians in large metropolitan areas with a population that is larger than one million and
which fully contain an MSA. A product j is the combination of a procedure, indexed by
its respective HCPCS billing code, and the provider group that carries it out, defined as:
Primary care, Laboratory, Emergency medicine & general surgeons, and Specialists. As
usual, the utility of the outside good (specialists) is normalized to zero.
Writing out the variables, the utility is equal to:
ui jt =
6
∑
urban=1
(1− γurban)
(−αip jt+ x jtβi+ξ jt+ηi jt)+ IPC 6∑
urban=1
γurbanRVU jt (2)
which can be written as:
ui jt =

∑6urban=1 (1− γurban)
(
α p jt+βx jt+ξ jt
)
patients’ mean utility
+IPC∑6urban=1 γurbanRVU jt physician’s utility within mean utility
+
(−p jt , x jt)∑6urban=1 (1− γurban)(ΠDi+Σνi) stochastic coefficients
+εi jt iid error term
(3)
where
(
p jt , x jt
)
are the product characteristics discussed below, ξ jt are product-market
unobservables, Di is a 5x1 vector of consumer i’s observable demographic characteristics
themselves based on changes in the reimbursement fees set by policy across time.
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(age, gender, risk score proxying health issues, income in thousands, and square of the
income in thousands), vi is a 10x1 vector of the effect of consumer i’s unobservable char-
acteristics on αi and βi parameters; Π is a 10x5 matrix of how αi and βi parameters depend
on the consumer observables, Σ is a 10x10 matrix of how those parameters depend on the
unobservables;
(
νiα , νiβ
)
,
(
Πα ,Πβ
)
,
(
Σα , Σβ
)
split the vector into two parts. The values
of Di are picked from the main database as draws of 20 random individuals in each market.
The values of νi are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution and are independent and
identically distributed. The εi jt are drawn from Type 1 extreme value distribution and are
independent and identically distributed across individuals, products, and markets.
I estimate four different specifications: a random coefficients model without the use of
demographic variables, but only with a stochastic element on the reimbursement variable
(in other words, the Di vector is set to zero), a random coefficients model with demographic
variables (the full version mentioned in this section), and a random coefficients model
with and without demographics with the use of Chamberlain optimal instruments. The full
specification of the model, a random coefficients model in which the random coefficients
is estimated using the demographic variation present in the data, is the one presented here.
The other specifications are all particular cases of this general one. Chamberlain optimal
instruments are functions of the characteristics and instrumental variables, as commonly
done in the literature.
I include ten product characteristics, equal to a constant and nine characteristics
(
p jt , x jt
)
at a provider group-procedure-market level. These control for the average price to receive
the procedure in that market carried out by that provider group, the relative value units
earned for that procedure, a proxy for the level of specialization of the physician, the ur-
banity level, a proxy for the average level of education, and a proxy for competition. Price
p jt is derived from the total amount billed by the provider minus the amount reimbursed by
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Medicare. The relative value units earned for that procedure, which are directly observed,
capture the physician’s ability to influence demand and are therefore the main variable of
interest in this chapter. The average level of specialization of all procedures performed by
physicians within each group measures the level of specialization of the procedures carried
out by the average doctor in that market The average urbanity level of the doctors in that
provider group and market, defined for each product, simply captures whether, on average,
the procedure-provider group combination is more common in a more urban or rural set-
ting. The average Medical Doctor (M.D.) index gives an index of whether the majority of
doctors considered in that product-market combination have an M.D. degree or not. Given
that each doctor can either be a M.D. (1) or not (0), this variable is between 0 and 1.2
The proxy for competition is calculated as the average number of doctors in own and other
provider groups in the same zip code as each doctor. Therefore, four variables proxy com-
petition: the average number of primary care physicians, specialists, emergency medicine
doctors, and laboratories in close proximity to each doctor considered. A higher number
indicates a higher competition in that product-market combination.
As usually done in the literature, the utility can be simplified by calling the mean utilities
δ ’s, for the patients and for the primary care physician respectively, a stochastic coefficient
component µ , and the random error:
ui jt = δ patientjt + IPCδ
PC
jt +
6
∑
urban=1
(1− γurban)µi jt+ εi jt (4)
2The other type of degree that physicians can hold is a D.O. degree, which categorizes them as osteopathic
physicians. Physicians with a D.O. are licensed in all 50 states to practice medicine and surgery, as well
to prescribe medications. Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that patients often display a preference for
M.D. doctors, who they consider better qualified. This variable controls for this.
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The market share of product j for consumer of type i in market t is then equal to
si jt =
exp
{
δ patientjt + IPCδPCjt +∑
6
urban=1 (1− γurban)µi jt
}
1+∑1175k=1 exp
{
δ patientkt + IPCδ
PC
kt +∑
6
urban=1 (1− γurban)µikt
} (5)
and the overall market share of product j in market t can be found by integrating the indi-
vidual market shares across the individual types, while weighing each type according to its
probability in the population. I denote Pˆ(D) the (empirical) distribution of the demographic
characteristics andN (ν) the distribution of the unobserved characteristics:
s jt =
∫
ν
∫
D
si jtdPˆ(D)dN (ν) (6)
s jt =
∫
ν
∫
D
exp
{
δ patientjt + IPCδPCjt +∑
6
urban=1 (1− γurban)µi jt
}
1+∑1175k=1 exp
{
δ patientkt + IPCδ
PC
kt +∑
6
urban=1 (1− γurban)µikt
}dPˆ(D)dN (ν)
The demographic characteristics are picked from the Medicare dataset. In order to proxy
for patients, I use the patient cumulative data available for each physician as a represen-
tative consumer for each product (specialty-procedure) combination. Since products are
defined at a wider level than physicians, thousands of patient proxies are available for each
market. I then sort them randomly and pick twenty observations per market of the follow-
ing characteristics: per capita income (which varies with every zip code), per capita income
squared, average risk score (a variable created by Medicare, which measures the general
“healthiness” of patients considering many different elements, from diabetes to cancer),
gender (as the percentage of patients that were female seen by each doctor), age (as the
average age of patients seen by each doctor).
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2.5 Data Analysis
To be able to analyze the margins along which primary care physicians carry out specialty
procedures, I first need to define what constitutes a specialty procedure. To do so, for every
procedure, I look at the number of times the procedure is carried out by specialists and pri-
mary are physicians, respectively, over the entire dataset (~26 million observations across
four years). In Figures 2.2 and 2.3 and in supplementary results available upon request,
I also analyze what percentage of physicians in primary and specialty care, respectively,
carry out any given procedure. I then consider the procedures of interest to be those per-
formed by specialists 50-80% of the time and by the primary care the remaining 20-50%.
Robustness checks show that the results are robust independently of the range chosen, but
their effect is stronger for tighter ranges. This approach creates a specialization index for
each procedure, from 0 to 1. An index value equal to 0 means that the procedure is only
carried out by specialists, while an index value of 1 means that it is always carried out by
primary care. Therefore, the lower the index value, the more specialized the procedure is.
Having built this index, I can analyze whether physicians, on general, perform proce-
dures within their specialty or not. I observe some clustering in the procedures carried
out, with primary care physicians carrying out either mostly primary care procedures (with
an average specialization index of at least 0.6) or almost exclusively specialty procedures
(with an average specialization index between 0.3 and 0.4). Among those primary care
physicians who perform at least one specialty procedure, it is also observed that they tend
to perform a large number of specialty procedures. The median procedure carried out by
these primary care physicians, as shown in Table 2.1, is one carried out by specialists 60%
of the time.
It is clear from this evidence as well as other data analysis reported in the online Ap-
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Table 2.1: Percentiles of degree of specialization (the lower the number, the more special-
ized)
Percentile
25th percentile 52.06%
50th percentile 63.44%
75th percentile 72.11%
90th percentile 80.99%
Notes: The variable of interest is an indicator variable, from 0 to
1, indicating the frequency of performance of each procedure by
primary care physicians and specialists. This table uses the aver-
age of this variable, for each doctor, across all procedures carried
out by that doctor. A value of 0 indicates that a doctor performs
only specialty procedures, a value of 1 indicates that a doctor only
performs primary care procedures. This table only shows the de-
gree of specializations for the doctors who perform at least one
specialty procedure.
pendix, that some primary care physicians are able to carry out a large number of specialty
procedures. The margin through which they are able to do so, which is the main theory
analyzed in this chapter, is how urban or rural the area where the physician practices is.
To be able to understand this better, I focus on procedures carried out by primary care
physicians 20-50% of the time and look at the distribution of doctors and services across
the urbanity index, by specialization, as shown in Figure 2.2.
For robustness, I restrict my attention to highly specialized procedures, i.e. the proce-
dures carried out by specialists 70-80% of the time and once again look at the distribution
of doctors and services across the urbanity index, by specialization, as shown in Figure
2.3.3
3 All the results that are presented in the remainder of this chapter are based on the procedures carried out by
specialists 60-80% of the time. All the results are qualitatively robust to different specialization ranges and
these robustness checks are available upon request.
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Figure 2.2: Procedures usually carried out by specialists 50-80% of the time
Notes: This figure concentrates on procedures usually carried out by specialists 50-80% of the time. The first
figure looks at the percentage of doctors carrying out these procedures (even just once) who are in primary
care vs some specialty, across urbanity levels. The second figure looks at the percentage of services provided
by primary care vs some specialty, across urbanity levels. The urbanity of the area is an index from 1 to 6,
where a higher value denotes a more rural area.
The preceding data analysis documented the following facts. First, specialty procedures
are also executed by primary care physicians, who seem to make an informed choice on
whether or not to provide specialty procedures. Moreover, those primary care doctors that
provide specialty procedures are likely to perform multiple specialty procedures. Finally,
primary care physicians in less populated, less urban areas are able to perform more spe-
cialty procedures than primary care physicians in more urban, densely-populated places.
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Figure 2.3: Procedures usually carried out by specialists 70-80% of the time
Notes: This figure concentrates on procedures usually carried out by specialists 70-80% of the time. The first
figure looks at the percentage of doctors carrying out these procedures (even just once) who are in primary
care vs some specialty, across urbanity levels. The second figure looks at the percentage of services provided
by primary care vs some specialty, across urbanity levels. The urbanity of the area is an index from 1 to 6,
where a higher value denotes a more rural area.
This latter finding hints at a tradeoff in their decision-making on what treatments to offer
and give to patients in different locations, supporting the theory of this chapter. The data
therefore support the theory that primary care physicians take over more specialty proce-
dures in more rural places, where specialists are not as present as they would be in cities.
The remainder of this chapter will focus on analyzing whether primary care physicians are
able to use this urbanity margin to take on more remunerative procedures.
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2.6 Empirical Evidence and Reduced-Form Results
This Section seeks to provide some empirical evidence as well as discuss some reduced-
form results that inform the theory of this chapter. To do so, I restrict my attention to the
procedures carried out by specialists 60-80% of the time and by primary care physicians
the remaining 20-40% of the time. As previously discussed, procedures are categorized
considering the incidence with which all procedures are carried out across all places and
years to be able to classify a procedure as a specialty procedure. All level analyses are
performed controlling for area-specific characteristics as well as patients’ demographics
and health characteristics.
First, I analyze whether there is a relationship between the reimbursement fees and the
frequency with which a given specialty procedure is carried out by primary care. Second, I
control for fixed effects exploiting the time variation in the data since reimbursement fees
are changed on an annual basis. I then estimate the effect that changes in the reimbursement
fees have on the probability with which a primary care physician carries out a specialty pro-
cedure through a logistic regression. I run the estimation both with and without frequency
weights. With frequency weights, the higher is the increase in the number of times the
more remunerative procedure is carried out, the higher the weight is.
The typical endogeneity challenge present in similar analyses of different industries is
less of a concern here due to the focus on Medicare patients. Medicare patients, as a matter
of fact, do not have to pay out-of-pocket for the entirety of the bill. For all the procedures
considered here, Medicare offers insurance coverage, guaranteeing that patients only have
to worry about a co-pay and a co-insurance rate. Therefore, it is highly plausible that
patients would not shop around to find a cheaper provider for that particular procedure, but
would take the price as given. This would imply that the coefficient on price should be very
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close to zero.
Nevertheless, there is still the potential of some unobservable effect on the price. To
illustrate, consider the fact that choices of physicians are often based on personal matters,
such as friendliness of the physician, recommendation from friends or family, or simply
him/her being the “family practice of the town.” Similarly to a higher-quality product in
another industry, this provider could have higher rates that could translate into a higher out-
of-pocket cost for patients. This would bias the price coefficient upward, indicating a lower
elasticity of patients to prices, when instead the choice of the higher-rate physician would
be due to factors that are unobserved by the econometrician. To control for this issue, I use
instrumental variables which represent input costs. These costs would increase a physi-
cian’s pricing menu but not be observed or considered by patients, which is the identifying
assumption necessary for the instrument to work. I utilize malpractice insurance reim-
bursement fees as a proxy for malpractice insurance. Malpractice insurance is a very good
proxy for costs: it is higher in cost for higher-cost cities and is higher for higher-risk spe-
cialties, which also involve greater costs for machines and equipment. The higher the cost
for insurance, the higher the total procedure billing, but malpractice insurance never enters
patients’ demand functions, as it is as a pure input cost and does not affect other charac-
teristics. I also include the so-called Geographical Adjustment Factors (GAFs), which are
cost-of-living adjustments for work, practice expenses, and malpractice insurance, proxy-
ing for regional variation in input costs. In the specifications that account for additional
heterogeneity, I supplement these instruments with functions of the same instruments, as
common in the literature: the interaction term of the work GAF with the practice expense
GAF, the square of the work GAF, and the square of malpractice reimbursement units. The
coefficient on price once it is instrumented is significant and negative, but still close to zero,
as theory would suggest.
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To provide some empirical reduced-form evidence supporting this chapter, let me first
report the results of a regression of the number of services provided by primary care for
specialty procedures on the reimbursement fees, controlling for costs, area-specific charac-
teristics as well as patients’ demographics and health characteristics. As previously men-
tioned, I restrict my attention to those procedures carried out by primary care physicians
20-40% of the time (and by specialists 60-80%). The results are shown in Table 2.2.
These results are consistent with the suggested theory. The geographical adjustment fac-
tors control for the cost of living in different areas, which explains the high value on the
procedure geographical adjustment (Procedure GAF) coefficient, as an increase of 1 in the
geographical practice cost indices is a very high increase. To illustrate, a unit increase in
the work and practice indices is equal to double the difference between the maximum and
minimum value in the same indices, while a unit increase in the malpractice insurance cost
index is roughly equal to the difference between the malpractice insurance cost in Wyoming
and the malpractice insurance cost in NYC suburbs. The procedure geographical adjust-
ments are higher, where the cost of living is higher, that is, in cities, so the parameters on the
geographical cost indices simply reflect the fact that more populated places lead to higher
service counts. The Procedure Reimbursement variable is the reimbursement factor. I find
that primary care physicians respond positively to increases in reimbursements, increasing
the number of more remunerative specialty procedures they carry out. To be precise, I find
that for every unit increase in the reimbursement revenue for a given procedure, equal to
about $36, the physician performs that procedure 3 more times.
Another key component of the analysis is the margin of urbanity. The urbanity index
value that is left out for comparison is the value attached to the most rural areas. Comparing
the parameters, it is easy to see that the more rural the area, the higher the service count of
procedures carried out by primary care physicians, as expected.
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Table 2.2: Number of procedures carried out by primary care physicians
Variables βˆ
Procedure Reimbursement 3.33
(5.44)
Procedure GAF 323.68
(81.31)
Large Metro w/in MSA -8.67
(1.85)
Large Metro -10.87
(1.71)
Metro with 250k≤ pop≤ 1mil -6.29
(1.49)
Metro with 50k≤ pop≤ 250k -2.34
(1.62)
Metro with 10k≤ pop≤ 50k -0.33
(1.57)
Constant -7.63
(0.29)
Observations 700,855
R2 0.31
Notes: Linear regression of variables of interest on the number of procedures
carried out by primary care physicians. The urbanity of the area is an index from
1 to 6, where a higher value denotes a more rural area. Geographical, procedure,
and year dummies are included, as well as demographic controls. Standard errors
in parentheses.
Next, I create a variable which takes value of 1 whenever a primary care doctor increases
the number of times a given specialty procedure is provided from a year to the next, 0
otherwise. I then run a logistic regression to see whether an increase in the reimbursement
rate of a given procedure raises the probability of a primary care physician increasing the
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number of times she carries out that procedure. The results in Table 2.3 show that an
increase in the reimbursement rate of one value unit for a given procedure, equal to roughly
a $36 increase, increases the probability of primary care physicians increasing the number
of times that procedure is carried out by about 16.6%. Frequency weights play an important
role in this estimation. Accounting for frequency weights, so that a higher weight is placed
on physicians who increase the number of procedures carried out more, an increase of one
relative value unit in a given procedure, equal again to about $36, leads to a 45.5% higher
probability of the primary care physician increasing the number of times that procedure is
carried out.
For robustness, I widen the set to the procedures carried out by primary care physicians
between 20 and 50% of the time (and by specialists 50-80% of the time). The results are
presented in the Appendix Section A.11 and show that the qualitative results are the same.
2.7 Structural Model Results
I run four specifications to estimate the model discussed in Section 2.4: the standard ran-
dom coefficients logit model, with and without Chamberlain’s optimal instruments, a spec-
ification that uses the demographic variation in the data to estimate the random coefficient,
and finally a random coefficient logit model using both Chamberlain’s optimal instruments
and the demographic variation in the data. Table 2.4 reports all results on the analysis of
primary care physicians increasing their share at expense of specialists along the urbanity
index. All specifications utilize the time variation in the data to identify the parameters.
Recall that the relative value units are set by policymakers annually.
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Table 2.3: Logit: y=1 if primary care physicians increase the number of specialty proce-
dures carried out - 20-40%
Variables (1) (2)
Change in Procedure Reimbursement 0.17 0.46
(0.02) (0.003)
Change in Malpractice Reimbursement -1.69 -3.39
(0.06) (0.01)
Change in Practice Reimbursement 0.25 0.63
(0.01) (0.001)
Change in Procedure GAF 9.25 37.02
(1.78) (0.19)
Change in Malpractice GAF -0.04 0.29
(0.02) (0.003)
Change in Practice GAF -3.20 -12.57
(0.71) (0.08)
Constant 1.94 2.75
(0.004) (0.004)
Frequency Weights NO YES
Observations 1,677,036 1,677,036
Notes: Logistic regression of variables of interest on whether or not primary care increases the specialty
procedures provided, with and without frequency weights. The procedures included are those that are
carried out by primary care physicians, on average, between 20 and 40% of times as suggested by the
specialization index previously discussed. Year dummies are included. Standard errors in parentheses.
A few results should be discussed. First, the price coefficient is very close to zero, but
negative, as expected in the previous discussion in Section 2.6. Second, the urbanity of the
area emerges again as a key margin for primary care physicians. The five variables which
look at the interaction of the reimbursement with the urbanity index generate estimates
that have to be compared with the reference variable, which value indicates the most rural
areas. The results support the empirical evidence shown in Section 2.6 that primary care
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physicians are able to increasingly take on a higher share of specialty procedures, the more
rural the area.
Since all the specifications are variation of the logit model, the Reader should recall
that the estimated coefficients on the interaction of the reimbursement with the urbanity
index, βˆrvu, are not exactly equal to the parameters of interest, which are instead equal to:
γurban= exp
{
βˆrvu,urban
}
−1 ∀ urban= 1, ...,6. To aid the Reader with the interpretation of
the coefficients, a summary of the coefficients of interest γurban are shown in the summary
Table 2.5, switching the point of view to set the most urban counterparts as the point of
reference. Bearing this in mind, I find that an increase in one relative value unit, once again
equal to about $36, primary care physicians are able to increase their share in specialty
procedures between 7 and 15% in more rural areas compared to their most urban counter-
parts, at the expense of specialists. These results provide some evidence that the urbanity
is a key margin along which primary care physicians can use the lower competition coming
from specialists to increase their reimbursements by carrying out the specialty procedures
themselves rather than referring them to specialists somewhere else. The most affected ar-
eas are very rural areas (the dummy of reference, which value is higher than almost every
other more urban value) and in small metropolitan areas (which is the only estimate higher
than the dummy of reference). Primary care physicians’ ability to increase their shares at
the expense of specialists along the urbanity index is very robust and significant across all
specifications.
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Table 2.5: Change in Physicians’ Weight in Consumers’ Utility with Respect to Physicians
in Large Metro Areas, γ
γ BLP BLP BLP BLP
Optimal Instruments Demographics Optimal Instruments and Demographics
γ2-Fringe Metro 9.42% 8.87% 8.80% 6.92%
γ3-Medium Metro 7.90% 7.79% 8.44% 7.79%
γ4-Small Metro 15.84% 15.49% 16.18% 14.91%
γ5-Micropolitan 7.04% 6.93% 8.33% 6.82%
γ6-Rural 12.30% 12.19% 11.74% 11.18%
Notes: This table shows the increase in the primary care physician’s utility weight on the consumer
utility, γ , along the urbanity index compared to the most urban classification (urban=1, large metro
area), for all specifications considered in this chapter. The four specifications are the following: a random
coefficients model that uses the BLP (1994) algorithm, the second one uses the same model but includes
Chamberlain optimal instruments, the third one uses the same model but lets the random coefficients
depend on the empirical distribution of demographic characteristics, and the final one includes both the
optimal instruments and the demographics in the estimation.
2.8 Conclusions and Future Work
Using data on the insured population of Medicare, this chapter has provided evidence for
a supply-induced mechanism in the demand for healthcare in the US. First, it has docu-
mented the novel fact that primary care physicians are able to carry out an increasing share
of specialty procedure in more rural areas of the United States, where specialists are fewer.
Second, this chapter has found that primary care physicians increase their share in spe-
cialty procedures more, the more lucrative they become, and are able to do so more, the
more rural the area they practice in. From the reduced-form results, this chapter has found
that an increase in one unit of reimbursement for a given procedure, equal to an increase in
reimbursement of about $36, leads to over a 45% higher probability of primary care physi-
cians providing a higher number of the more lucrative procedure. Structurally, this chapter
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has estimated that the same $36 reimbursement increase for a given procedure leads to an
increase in the primary care physician share in that specialty procedure by 7-15% more in
less urban areas compared to their most urban counterparts, at the expense of specialists.
Small metropolitan areas (with a population between 50,000 and 250,000 people) and very
rural areas (with a population smaller than 10,000 people) are the most affected.
This chapter has also been the beginning of a more comprehensive research project an-
alyzing physicians’ choices bearing in mind how 1) specialty differences are crucial when
modeling their behavior, 2) reimbursements are a key income component that has been
largely ignored in many analyses, and 3) the urbanity of the area comes into play in many
different ways, and it is clear from the results found in this chapter that physicians practice
differently according to where they are. Chapter 3 keeps these factors in mind when ana-
lyzing the determinants of physicians’ location choice, with a focus on the rural shortage of
physicians. Other ongoing projects analyze the substitutability of primary care physicians
with nurse practitioners, the effect of nurse practitioner regulations on primary care entry,
and finally the impact of the physician workforce on the population’s health.
Despite the many projects that have sprung from this analysis, many questions arise that
still have to be addressed. First, a natural extension to this chapter is to analyze the supply
side of this issue. In particular, primary care physicians need to make investment choices to
be able to offer specialized treatments. Second, related to Chapter 3, it would be interesting
to study how these financial incentives influence medical students’ choices. It is plausible
that medical students have adjusted their specialty choices since the implementation of the
fee-for-service system based on the possibility to get different financial benefits from dif-
ferent locations. This question is important to explain the decrease in students’ interest in
primary care specialties following the 1992 change in Medicare pricing. This hypothesis
is able to rationalize the wage and offering differential across specialties, while also show-
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ing that the ability for primary care to perform more specialized procedures in less urban
areas is the result of the pricing mechanism described in this chapter. Therefore, this the-
ory would be able to explain not only the general decline in the interest for primary care
specialties, but also the geographical shifts in the primary care distribution in the country.
Finally, as suggested in the introduction, this chapter strongly relates to the arguments
discussing the relationship between a fee-for-system payment scheme and overutilization.
This chapter has provided a key insight to the issue of overutilization by showing that
a change in financial incentives also leads to a reallocation in the providers carrying out
the same procedures. Considering the primary care physicians’ increase in specialty proce-
dures caused by the increased financial incentives as overutilization would overlook the fact
that this increase comes at the expense of specialists, as analyzed in this chapter. There-
fore, this chapter has provided evidence that it is key to consider two complementing effects
caused by fee-for-service: a reallocation in the procedures carried out by each specialty for
a given total number of procedures, as shown here, and the increase in the number of total
procedures carried out overall without an apparent increase in patients’ health issues, the
latter of which is not analyzed in this chapter and should be subject to future research.
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Chapter 3
The Determinants of Physicians’
Location Choice:
Understanding the Rural Shortage
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3.1 Introduction
A long-standing challenge in the US health care system is the provision of medical services
to rural areas, where 25% of the population live, but only 10% of physicians operate.4
An extensive discussion on academic and media outlets alike has taken place regarding
the need for physicians in many areas of the United States, which are dubbed as Health
Professional Shortage Areas (HPSA). With roughly 60 million Americans living in rural
areas, it is evident that rural Americans make up for a major part of the affected population.
Policymakers have tried to bring more doctors into rural areas, most notably with loan
forgiveness programs, which have been further incentivized through their tax exclusion
via the Affordable Care Act. As a further incentive, higher fixed salaries are also usually
offered to physicians who decide to practice in rural areas. While the number of primary
care physicians who practice rurally has increased, the physician shortage is still a very
real problem, especially for some (rural) areas. Therefore, fully understanding the different
factors that affect physicians in their geographical choices is important in designing policies
that aim for a more even distribution of physicians in caring for the American population.
This chapter develops a model of physicians’ location choices and uses it to explore
the impact of policy changes, such as loan forgiveness and salary incentives, on the geo-
graphical distribution of physicians. I focus on the choice of the first job following resi-
dency, therefore analyzing the location choice once the specialty is already picked. While
studies have been done regarding the choice of residency, the so-called medical match
(for instance, see Agarwal 2015), this chapter does not look at the specialty choice along
with location. The decision to take the specialty as given allows me to ignore the issue
4See, among others, Aaron Carroll, “A Doctor Shortage? Let’s Take a Closer Look,” The New York Times,
November 7, 2016 as well as Gary Hart’s interview, Ann Harrington, “Training More Country Doctors,”
Fedgazette, October 12, 2017.
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of residency slots available as well as all the details of “the match.” I build a structural
spatial equilibrium model in which physicians are heterogeneous along their specialty, de-
mographics, and quality ranking. Identification of the parameters of interest (income) is
challenged by the possible correlation between unobserved characteristics of location and
wages, as offered wages are higher where amenities are fewer. To overcome this issue, I
collect micro-level data from physicians’ directories on doctors’ medical school, residency,
and first job choices. This wealth of information and structural methods of demand à la
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) allow me to back up the unobserved characteristics
and identify the parameters of interest exactly.
The differentiation between specialty groups is shown to be key in policy design. As
shown in Chapter 2, the mix of treatments that primary care physicians and specialists per-
form varies along the urbanity index. In particular, primary care physicians perform more
specialist procedures (and therefore receive higher reimbursements) in rural areas, due to
the lower competition coming from specialists in those areas. Capturing this heterogeneity
allows policies to be designed more efficiently by targeting the groups of physicians who
would respond the most. Moreover, the information on physicians’ quality ranking enables
me to vary the job choice set according to each physician’s quality level. This is important
in the design of choice sets as the set of jobs available to each physician critically depends
on the physician’ quality. There is a vast literature addressing how misspecification of
the choice sets leads to choice model misspecification. Gopinath (1995) provides a good
overview of the theoretical and empirical issues on this topic.
Several factors affect the location choice. I allow physicians to respond to their full real
income (therefore accounting for salary, reimbursements, rent, malpractice insurance, and
student loan repayment), as well as to amenities and heterogeneous location preferences.
One immediate trade-off related to physicians’ incentives is the higher salary offered in
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rural areas to compensate individuals for the typical lack of amenities (see, for example,
Lee 2010). However, the urbanity of the area not only influences the amenities of the
area but also the competition from doctors in surrounding areas, which in turn affects the
procedures that physicians can carry out. Physicians’ revenue stream is composed of two
parts: a salary part that behaves as theory would predict by increasing salaries in less
desired areas, and a reimbursement part. This latter part depends only on the procedures
carried out and is adjusted for the cost of living, meaning that the rate adjustments are
greater for physicians in urban areas than for those in rural areas. Moreover, the number
and type of services provided also vary along the urbanity index. Chapter 2 shows that
each physician’s market share for a given treatment in a particular location depends on
the number of primary care physicians and specialists performing the same treatment in
that market. As a result, primary care physicians in rural areas are able to increase their
income by carrying out more specialized procedures. Since the fee-for-service part of
their income does not depend on their specialty but only on the procedures they carry
out, and since such specialized procedures have increasingly been reimbursed more than
primary care procedures, this creates incentives for primary care physicians to work in rural
areas. Therefore, these different components of income and how they are affected by the
distribution of physicians must be accounted for. On the supply side, I allow physicians’
income to respond to the employment of physicians of either type, bearing these facts in
mind.
I also allow for a home bias toward the place where the doctor completed his or her
residency, based on data evidence. To be able to control for quality, I match the ranking
of the medical school (based on the average score of MCATs, among other things) and the
ranking of residency to proxy for physicians’ quality ranking. As mentioned beforehand,
quality not only is important as a demographic variable but also is key in the choice set
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definition.
Next, I analyze what factors affect their geographical distribution the most. Firstly, the
results suggest that the two specialty groups respond to compensation differently, as spe-
cialists are more elastic to both net income and amenities. Both groups, however, enjoy
higher net incomes and higher amenities. I find that top-50 residents respond more to both
income and amenities, while foreign physicians are not systematically different from Amer-
icans. Persistence in location choice is key, as I find that primary care physicians are about
3.8 times more likely to work in the same state as their residency and about 3.4 times more
likely to work in the same hospital referral region as their residency. Similarly, specialists
are 2.8 times more likely to work in the same state as their residency and about 3.6 times
more likely to remain in the same hospital referral region for work. I am able to reject that
retention values can be the same between primary care physicians and specialists. I also
find that top-50 residents in primary care are 0.4 times more likely to remain in the same
state as their residency for work, but they are 1.5 times less likely to remain in the same area
as residency. Conversely, I find that top-50 residents in specialty care are 0.3-0.4 times less
likely to be retained within the same state and area of residency. Comparing these results
to the labor literature, I find a very interesting result. While all physicians are clearly high-
skilled workers, primary care physicians display the same persistence in location choices
as unskilled workers. Diamond (2015), for example, reports a semi-elasticity of retention
for high-skilled individuals to remain within their state of birth equal to 2.6. That estimate
is closer to the values I find for specialists, but much lower than the values that I find for
primary care physicians. This shows that there are extremely important differences not
only across occupation types, but also within occupations that might be ignored in current
analyses.
Finally, I use the model to analyze the performance of current policies targeted at bring-
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ing physicians to rural areas. I find that 0.5% more primary care residents and 1.3% more
specialists have picked rural areas due to loan forgiveness alone. Monetary incentives in
the form of bonus payments averaging $7,500 are responsible for a further 0.2% increase
in primary care physicians and 0.1% increase in specialists. By retargeting the spending
currently used for loan forgiveness to higher salary incentives for rural employment, I find
that almost 6 times more primary care physicians would pick rural areas compared to the
effect of loan forgiveness. Since primary care physicians are the main physician category
that currently provides medical care to rural areas, and since they do not need a particular
infrastructure to do so, these results suggest that policymakers should retarget spending
from loan forgiveness to salary incentives and that offering salary incentives to primary
care physicians only would be even more effective. The average quality of the physicians
attracted under these higher salary incentives is also better compared to loan forgiveness.
Another possible policy intervention suggested by the high persistence in physicians’ loca-
tion choices is the use of these monetary incentives to create rural residencies. Since the
residency choice is not directly modeled in this chapter, this question is outside the scope
of this chapter but will be addressed in future work.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces a brief literature review, Section 3
presents a few definitions and descriptive facts, Section 4 describes the many data sources
used in this chapter, Section 5 examines the model, Section 6 discusses the estimation
techniques, Sections 7 presents and discusses the results and their implications, Section 8
discusses the counterfactuals run, and Section 9 concludes.
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3.2 Literature Review
This chapter contributes to three strands of literature: it complements and extends the old
microeconomics literature on physician location and geographical distribution, it provides
more insight to the health economics literature on physicians’ response to incentives, and
it relates and extends the labor literature on location choice of skilled workers.
First, this chapter contributes to the strand of literature on physician location. Cooper et
al. (1975), Leonardson, Lapierre, and Hollingsworth (1985), Steele and Rimlinger (1965)
are all papers that have provided evidence for an uneven distribution of physicians. Nev-
ertheless, the papers in the literature provide some data evidence through surveys and
reduced-form analyses without providing a mechanism for their location choices. Previ-
ous discussion on the topic of location choice has mainly focused on the tradeoff between
amenities and salary, as in Lee (2010). Lee provides evidence of higher salaries rurally
than urbanely and provides a theory that the increased salary has to make up for the lack
of amenities. There has also been a lot of attention regarding the shortage of physicians
and the distribution of physicians’ location, including Kirch, Henderson, and Dill (2012)
and Cooper et al. (2002). This chapter complements their analysis by providing the ma-
jor components that affect the choice of physicians’ location and possible solution to the
physicians’ shortage. There has also been a lot of attention recently regarding the short-
age of physicians and the distribution of physicians’ location, including Kirch, Henderson,
and Dill (2012) and Cooper et al. (2002). This chapter complements their analysis by
providing the major components that affect the choice of physicians’ location and possible
solution to the physicians’ shortage. Kulka and McWeeny (2018) also structurally analyzes
physicians’ location choices and evaluates policies the induce physicians to move to rural
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areas, but my analysis differs in several important respects.5 First, I differentiate across
specialty groups. Second, I make use of individual-level data on physicians’ training and
work history to estimate the value of retention from remaining within the same area as their
residency and to define the choice set according to the physicians’ quality. Finally, I em-
ploy a more detailed measure of compensation that includes net income that also depends
on reimbursements, rent, malpractice insurance, and student loan repayments.
This chapter also contributes to the strand of health economics literature discussing how
physicians respond to financial incentives, basing part of the analysis on Chapter 2. Chap-
ter 2 provides evidence for a supply-induced demand mechanism for more remunerative
treatments. It finds that primary care physicians are able to take on more specialist ser-
vices in less urban areas, where they gain higher market shares due to the lower number of
specialists in close proximity. In particular, the increase in the weight of the primary care
physicians’ financial interests in the consumer utility ranges between 7-16% compared to
physicians in large metropolitan areas, at the expense of specialists. More generally, Lee
(2010) shows that higher rural salaries provide an incentive for physicians to trade off lower
amenities for higher compensation. There has been an extensive literature on the response
of physicians to financial incentives in a hospital setting (Acemoglu and Finkelstein 2008,
Finkelstein 2007) , in managed care (Lori 2009), for specific procedures (Gruber & Ow-
ings 1994, Grant 2009, Shrank 2005, Jacobson 2006), and across geographical locations
(Clemens and Gottlieb 2014). This chapter complements this literature by including finan-
cial incentives in the analysis, without only focusing on wages, but also by analyzing how
physicians trade off monetary incentives for non-monetary ones.
Since physicians make up for a very important occupational group, this chapter also
complements the location choice strand of the labor literature across skill levels, includ-
5I learned of their paper after completing a first draft of my chapter.
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ing, but not limited to, Diamond (2015) and Colas (2018). Of course, physicians are all
part of skilled labor. Nevertheless, this chapter provides insight on within-occupation
differences across types and shows that, at least for physicians, the differences between
within-occupation types are just as important as those between the unskilled and the skilled.
This chapter also complements the structural labor literature on location choice and market
structure, such as Dunne et al. (2013).
Methodologically, this chapter bases itself mostly on Berry, Levinsohn, Pakes (1995,
hereafter: BLP). While BLP has been one of the most predominant tools in the literature
for demand estimation, this chapter applies the tool to a location choice setting. Thanks
to the differentiation across locations and the presence of physician cohorts looking for a
job at the same time nationally, I utilize this algorithm to identify what drives the choice
of physicians’ location, matching the share of physicians picking one location over all the
physicians looking for a job in the same year. I include demographic characteristics of
physicians and integrate over the empirical distribution of such characteristics to identify
random coefficients. The information on physicians’ quality ranking enables me to vary the
job choice set according to each physician’s quality level. This information is then used in
the design of choice sets as the set of jobs available to each physician critically depends on
the physician’ quality. This is key as a misspecification of choice sets would lead to choice
model misspecification.
3.3 Data
The geographical unit of study is a hospital referral region (HRR), as defined by the Health
Resources & Services Administration. Therefore, any location-level characteristics are
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estimated for these geographic areas through data at the county-, metro-, and zip-code level,
allocated to HRRs by averaging or aggregating the values up to the HRR-level according
to their geographical location. The goal of HRRs is to define areas that are self-contained
markets for primary care, so that the majority of patients living in that area go to primary
care physicians within that area. The urban/rural classification follows the U.S. Census
Bureau definition according to the 2010 Census criteria.
The primary source of data for this chapter comes from the Centers for Medicare & Med-
icaid Services (CMS). The Physician and Other Supplier Public data provides information
on services and procedures provided to Medicare beneficiaries by physicians. It contains
information on utilization, actual Medicare reimbursement, and submitted charges. Each
line of the dataset is indexed by a National Provider Identifier (NPI), which identifies each
doctor in the dataset, by a Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) code,
which identifies every procedure carried out by each doctor, and by the place of service,
indicating whether the procedures were carried out in a facility setting or not. The data
is based on information from CMS administrative claims data for Medicare beneficiaries
enrolled in the fee-for-service program. The data are available for calendar years 2012
through 2016 and contain the universe of physicians taking part in Medicare Part B for the
fee-for-service population. There are a little over 40 million observations in the dataset
across over a million of physicians in the panel.
Despite the wealth of information on payment and utilization for Medicare Part B ser-
vices, the dataset has a number of limitations. The data may not be representative of a
physician’s entire practice as it only includes information on Medicare fee-for-service ben-
eficiaries. However, since Medicare influences the payment system of 80% of physicians
(Clemens & Gottlieb (2017)), this data allows for the analysis of physicians’ behavior un-
der this payment mechanism, which is then relevant for the greatest majority of doctors in
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the country. In addition, the data are not intended to indicate the quality of care provided
and are not risk-adjusted to account for differences in underlying severity of disease of pa-
tient populations. To counter this, demographic data on patients’ riskiness and incidence
of diseases will be included in the estimation. Despite these limitations, some positive
characteristics should be highlighted. First of all, the fact that all beneficiaries are covered
by Medicare eliminates the issues related to the status of insurance of the beneficiaries. In
particular, it allows me to abstract from other endogenous characteristics related to the in-
surance status of beneficiaries when a full dataset (not Medicare only) is used. Moreover, it
also allows me to ignore the network effects of different insurance policies as well as their
different payment plans. In practice, therefore, this dataset provides a more homogenous
universe of insured individuals who receive different treatments according to the condition
that they have. Once fixed effects are accounted for, then, these data are perfect for the
question at hand.
As far as the illness and disease distribution is concerned, average beneficiary risk scores
are provided on the “Medicare Physician and Other Supplier Aggregate Table” (i.e., one
record per NPI) to provide information on the health status of the beneficiaries the providers
serve for every year of interest together with the rate of incidence of a number of diseases
and illnesses among the patients seen by each physician for every year. Therefore, this can
account for the average health of the patients visited by each physician.
For this to work, it is important to recall that almost the universe of physicians par-
ticipates in Medicare (and I will observe the physician as soon as they have one patient
enrolled in Medicare Part B). To be precise, over 91% of physicians accept new Medicare
patients and 96% of Medicare seniors have access to care through their physicians/clinic.
Almost 92% of Medicare fee-for-service patients can get an appointment for routine care
as needed.
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To understand when the physician chooses their first job, I need to know when they finish
their training. To do so, I use two more datasets. First, I get all the data from Medicare
Physician Compare. Since it is a file created by Medicare, I can match physicians through
the NPI. This directory allows me to see their graduation year as well as their medical
school for about half of the physicians. Unfortunately, this dataset seems to not report
the medical school name for many physicians, by absorbing all of them under “Other.”
To resolve this issue and be able to account for their residency training as well, I scrape
data from the internet directories, in particular Doximity.com, where physicians publish
a wealth of information regarding their training and affiliations. I am able to then have
a sample of physicians scraped off the internet matched not only to their specialty and
office address, but also to their graduation year, medical school, residency, internship and
fellowship participation, among other characteristics. From their graduation year, I add the
number of years of residency depending on their specialty, as well as an extra year each
if they do a year of internship or fellowship. Having done this, I know the year they pick
their first job, and I then select out those that pick their first job between 2012 and 2016,
to be able to match the variables in the Medicare data. I call the full panel I created the
“Physician Work History Panel.”
A selected sample of variables from the Physician Work History Panel is available in
Table 1 to provide the Reader with a flavor of the collected data.
To have a proxy of the level of quality/skill that physicians could be characterized by, I
use the US News rankings for medical schools, by specialty. Moreover, I use the Doxim-
ity Residency Navigator ranking to proxy for the quality of the residency program, by
specialty. Recall that each physician declares their specialty and I am able to control for
multiple if they identify with more than one. This allows me to identify a normalized rank-
ing of their medical school and residency, as well as to know whether they have attended a
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Table 3.6: Physicians Work History Panel
Primary Care Specialists
Number of Residents 9,691 22,068
Years in the Panel 2012-2016 2012-2016
Locations Chosen Between 2012-6 305 305
% with First Job in Big Metros 60% 70%
% with First Job in Small Cities 30% 25%
% with First Job in Rural Areas 10% 5%
% that Completed Residency in Big Metros 58% 75%
% that Completed Residency in Small Cities 31% 24%
% that Completed Residency in Rural Areas 1% 1%
Notes: The Physician Work History Panel is a dataset that I created and that provides physician-level data on their
training and on the work they currently carry out. The Panel is created through two main data sources: first, I use the
Medicare Part B Utilization and Payment data; second, I scrape physician directories (mainly Doximity.com) to be able
to determine their medical training (medical school, , residency). I then use the medical school information to infer the
level of student debt they would be facing and I collect Bureau of Labor Statistics data on wages by occupation title to
collect information on salaries. While this panel covers almost the universe of physicians, I focus on residents that finish
residency and enter the medical job market in this chapter. More details on the data collection and sample validation are
available in the text and appendix. There are 306 HRR in the US.
top 50, top 30, top 50 school and residency, as well as whether or not they attended a school
or residency in the bottom quarter percentile of the rankings. Moreover, even though I do
not observe physicians’ immigrant status, I can get insight from the medical school they
attended. This is interesting because foreigners can obtain a visa waiver if they practice
in health professional shortage areas or medically underserved areas. I match the medical
schools I observe to their addresses and mark those outside the United States, assuming
that a person that studied abroad for medical school is, in fact, foreign. The foreign param-
eter would be, if anything, understated, since I cannot observe immigrants that migrated
prior to medical school, but it should be a good enough proxy for the analysis at hand. By
including this in the analysis, I am able to see whether there is, in fact, a higher choice of
rural placements by foreigners to be able to take advantage of visa benefits.
The other crucial variable for the analysis is the salary received by physicians. For this,
I utilize the Occupation Employment Statistics (OES) at the Metropolitan Statistical Area
51
(MSA)-level for the main occupational divide (primary care vs. surgeons) and subspecial-
ties defined by BLS. The fixed salary data gives an idea of the incentives that physicians
face from a pure salary perspective, but they do not include the reimbursement amounts de-
pendent on fee-for-service income. As per Chapter 2, this reimbursement highly depends
on the procedures carried out, but these in turn depend not only on the specialty that carries
them out, but on the location where the physician is located as well. For this reason, I
believe that it is important to consider both income sources in the analysis.6
The location characteristics included in the amenity index come from many different
sources: County Business Patterns (2012-2016), Federal Bureau of Investigation crime re-
ports (2012-2016), Environmental Protection Agency Air Quality Index (2012-2016), Cen-
sus of Governments (2012), National Center of Education Statistics, American Community
Survey (2012-2016). Refer to section 6.1 for a more complete discussion on the amenity
index estimation.
Finally, the choice of a location that displays a shortage of physicians is often associated
with high benefits in terms of loan forgiveness. Since my entire dataset is post-Obamacare
(when these benefits became higher and tax-deductible), the control for those areas desig-
nated as health professional shortage areas captures the loan forgiveness effect. To capture
the benefit given by this particular element, I match the medical schools to their tuitions
and calculate the amount of student debt that the resident would be facing. The medical
debt then disappears as an expense if they were to choose areas offering loan forgiveness.
The sample can explain almost the entirety of the variance in the data, with an R2 of
93.74% for primary care physicians and 96.47% for specialists. Notice that the sample
should not display a perfect fit. As a matter of fact, since the data is based on the Area
6Recall the discussion in section 3.2.
52
Table 3.7: Physicians Work History Panel vs. Leading Data Source
Physician Work History Panel Leading Data Source %
Total Year 3 Residents 31,759 37,617 (Board) 84%
2012 Primary Care Population 198,310 237,346 (AHRF) 84%
2013 Primary Care Population 201,527 242,955 (AHRF) 83%
2014 Primary Care Population 203,445 244,638 (AHRF) 83%
2015 Primary Care Population 205,064 245,983 (AHRF) 83%
2016 Primary Care Population 186,312 247,069 (AHRF) 75%
Notes: The Physician Work History Panel is a dataset that I created and that provides physician-level data on their training and on
the work they currently carry out. The Panel is created through two main data sources: first, I use the Medicare Part B Utilization and
Payment data; second, I scrape physician directories (mainly Doximity.com) to be able to determine their medical training (medical
school, , residency). I then use the medical school information to infer the level of student debt they would be facing and I collect
Bureau of Labor Statistics data on wages by occupation title to collect information on salaries. While this panel covers almost the
universe of physicians, I focus on residents that finish residency and enter the medical job market in this chapter. This table provides
one of many validation exercises to compare the Physician Work History Panel to commonly used data sources for similar statistics.
Since I do not have access to any dataset that measures the number of residents on the medical job market by year, I approximate it by
the number of Year 3 Residents. Notice that some Year 3 Residents continue their training. Therefore, the leading data source should
provide a slightly higher value than the number of residents in my panel, as it is indeed true. Next, I also show in this table how the
Physician Work History Panel compares in terms of primary care physician population. To do so, I utilize the Area Health Resource
Files by county and I aggregate my data up to the county level to enable a comparison. The Physician Work History Panel is able to
reproduce the levels and changes in the physician population closely. Similar statistics are true for specialists as well. More details on
the data collection and sample validation are available in the text and appendix.
Resource File data, residents and non-degree primary care physicians are included in the
estimates, while my sample excludes them. I also perform some validation exercise on the
whole population of primary care physicians and specialists by year, by looking at the Area
Health Resource File by county, specialty, and year. Table 2 reports a sample of the results.
Overall, the sample considered can explain about 85% of all leading data sources.
Finally, I also checked the retention rate in the data vs. in the sample. My sample
produces a within-state retention of 51.4% overall, while the data displays a 54% state
retention nationally, further confirming the sample fit.
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3.4 Descriptive Facts
3.4.1 Definition of Income
Income in this chapter is calculated using five elements. First, I include both reimburse-
ments and salaries to their total revenues. Second, I subtract from their total revenues three
types of expenses: average housing cost in their area, malpractice insurance payments, and
student loan repayments.
Reimbursement Much of the health literature focuses on analyzing hospitals and physi-
cians in a hospital setting. While physicians in my dataset can indeed have hospital affil-
iations, it is important to differentiate how I define their income. Since hospitals behave
completely in a different manner regarding reimbursements, I focus on aggregating reim-
bursement from CMS Medicare Part B data, which excludes hospital bills. This is partic-
ularly important because common practice for hospitals is to file all reimbursements for
all physicians, and wages paid out to the physicians directly employed by the hospital will
simply be adjusted for them.
To be able to combine the effect of receiving reimbursements and wages, I therefore sin-
gle out reimbursements billed for outpatient procedures, which are billed directly and paid
out directly to the doctors. These actually make up for a high portion of aggregate health
expenditures, as shown in 1. Since they constitute a substantial portion of their income,
physicians internalize them in their decision-making.
Salaries On the other hand, salaries are obtained through the Bureau of Labor Statistics
and do not include reimbursements. BLS collects its data through a survey of employers
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that only report the salary paid. Any amounts billed independently by physicians is not
included in the estimate. Self-employed physicians are not included in the wage estimates
by BLS. I observe whether or not the physician is in a facility (hospital or clinic) or in an
office setting and I am therefore able to differentiate between the two types of physicians
for robustness.
Housing costs Housing costs are obtained from the Census American Community Survey,
at the zip-code level. Average housing costs are calculated for individuals with incomes
higher than $70,000. I focus on owner costs and use the average between mortgage- and
non-mortgage-holders.
Malpractice insurance Malpractice insurance costs are estimated according to the mal-
practice reimbursement rates set by Medicare. In the future, I plan on adjusting these based
on observed insurance rates.
Student Loans Student loan repayments are estimated in the following manner. First,
I match each individual to the medical school he or she attended. Second, I match the
medical school to the tuition cost for the four years of medical school, as available through
their “Tuition and Rates” page online. Third, I follow the very common 10-year repayment
plan most students would be on to calculate the average annual student loan repayment.
According to the plan, the average interest rate is 6%, which is what I use in this chapter.
The interest starts accruing from year one, but payments are deferred until after residency.
While residents face the choice to start repaying loans during residency, very few do. Since
I do not know who does, I assume everybody starts repaying their loans following res-
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idency. For areas defined as health professional shortage areas, this cost is set to zero,
assuming that residents deciding to move to these areas, would indeed remain for the years
necessary to have their loans forgiven.
3.4.2 Reimbursement
This section briefly walks the Reader through the way reimbursements are set and how they
vary on an annual basis.
The current (since 1992) fee-for-service system is called the Resource-Based Relative
Value Scale (RBRVS). The system was based on some initial rates and geographical adjust-
ment factors, which would be reviewed on an annual basis by the RVS Update Committee
(RUC). The RUC was meant to only have an advisory role, but its recommendations are
accepted 97% of the time, making it de facto the fee-setting organization.
The Reader should bear in mind that the fee-for-service system is not new to 1992. The
system before, the Usual, Customary, and Reasonable (UCR) system, was still based on
a fee-for-service reimbursement; however, these reimbursements were not standardized
across doctors and tractability was not possible also due to lack of information on individ-
ual pricing. This is what prompted discussions at the beginning of 1990 to reform it. This
chapter shows that the new pricing system exacerbated the issue, leading to a change in
doctors’ decision making. Moreover, it allows the researcher to be able to estimate the im-
pact of this pricing on physicians’ choices due to the fee standardization (and its availability
publicly).
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For each procedure j in a geographical area-year t, the reimbursement is equal to:
Reimbursement jt =Constantt ∗RVU jt ∗GAFt (7)
The constant only depends on the year and is equal across specialties and procedures. The
relative value units change according to the procedure as well as the year, and the geo-
graphic adjustment factors (GAFs) depend on both the area and the year.
The constant, called the Conversion Factor (CF), is a national adjustment factor, which is
identical across specialties, areas, and procedures. The 2017 CF is equal to $35.8887. The
GAFs are a proxy for cost of living, adjusting for differences in input costs across payment
regions.
The RUC’s recommendations across the years have been constantly widening the gap be-
tween the procedure reimbursements usually carried out by specialists and those regularly
carried out by primary care.
Since the reimbursement does not depend on who carries out the procedure, but only on the
procedure itself, and specialist procedures are more highly priced than typical primary care
procedures, this payment system generates financial incentives for primary care doctors
to substitute to more specialized, remunerative procedures when possible. See the next
section for some data analysis that was present in Chapter 2 and reported here again for
convenience, supporting this statement.
3.4.3 Physicians in Different Locations Act Differently
This subsection briefly summarizes some data findings available in Chapter 2, which sup-
port the hypothesis held in this chapter that physicians take into consideration the level of
57
reimbursement in their decision-making. Since physicians perform different procedures in
different places, the choice of location inherently encompasses that information.
In particular, primary care physicians are able to perform more remunerative specialist
procedures in rural areas, where specialists are not as present. Since specialist procedures
have been paid increasingly more over the years, the possibility of carrying such procedures
out in more rural areas makes rural areas more attractive from a remuneration point of you.
However, classical analysis only considers a tradeoff between wages and amenities, and
does not take into consideration this other very important remuneration channel.
I report here some data evidence on physicians acting differently along the urbanity index.
In first need to identify what constitutes a specialist procedure. To do so, I look at the
number of services per procedure carried out by each doctor and see how many doctors
in primary care perform it and how many specialists perform it over the entire dataset.
Then, for each procedure, I calculate the percentage of services performed by primary
care physicians (PC) versus specialists. I then consider the procedures of interest to be
those performed by specialists 50-80% of the time and by the primary care the remaining
20-50%. Robustness checks show that the results are robust independently of the range
chosen, but their effect is stronger for tighter ranges. This approach creates a specialization
index for each procedure, from 0 to 1. An index value equal to 0 means that the procedure
is only carried out by specialists, while an index value of 1 means that it is always carried
out by primary care. Therefore, the lower the index value, the more the procedure is a
specialized one. Next, I consider all the procedures carried out by each doctor and their
respective specialization index values. I then take the average of these values across all
the procedures carried out by each doctor, for every doctor. This generates a physician-
level specialization index which marks whether or not each doctor behaves as a specialist.
Similarly to before, if a doctor had an average of 0, it would mean that he only carried
58
Figure 3.4: Procedures usually carried out by specialists 50-80% of the time
Notes: This figure concentrates on procedures usually carried out by specialists 50-80% of the time. The first figure looks at the
percentage of doctors carrying out these procedures (even just once) who are in primary care vs some specialty, across urbanity levels.
The second figure looks at the percentage of services provided by primary care vs some specialty, across urbanity levels. The urbanity
of the area is an index from 1 to 6, where a higher value denotes a more rural area.
out specialist procedures and if he had an average of 1, it would mean that he only carried
out PC procedures. Therefore, the lower the average, the higher the number of specialist
procedures carried out by the doctor. I call this variable the degree of specialization of
doctors. I then focus on procedures carried out by PC physicians 20-50% of the time and
look at the distribution of doctors across the urbanity index, as shown in Figure 2.
I then restrict my attention to highly specialized procedures, i.e. the procedures carried out
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Figure 3.5: Procedures usually carried out by specialists 70-80% of the time
Notes: This figure concentrates on procedures usually carried out by specialists 70-80% of the time. The first figure looks at the
percentage of doctors carrying out these procedures (even just once) who are in primary care vs some specialty, across urbanity levels.
The second figure looks at the percentage of services provided by primary care vs some specialty, across urbanity levels. The urbanity
of the area is an index from 1 to 6, where a higher value denotes a more rural area.
by specialists 70-80% of the time. I then analyze how many doctors and how many of these
services are carried out by primary care doctors and by specialists across the urbanity level,
and present the results in Figure 3.
This brief data analysis shows how primary care doctors take over more specialist proce-
dures in rural places, and do so even more in locations where specialists are not around.
The income differential between procedures typically carried out by primary care physi-
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cians and those typically carried out by specialists is key in this behavior and supports the
hypothesis of this chapter that reimbursements should be included when analyzing physi-
cians’ location choice.
For a more complete analysis on physicians’ response to the financial incentives generated
by this behavior, refer to Chapter 2.
3.5 Model
From now on, for ease of exposition, I will refer to location choice, city choice, and hospital
referral region (HRR) choice interchangeably. The goal of HRRs is to define areas that are
self-contained markets for physicians, so that the majority of patients living in that area
would be able to remain within their HRR for any visit they need. There are 306 HRRs in
the United States. The model shown here is written as the model of a physician picking
their location choice. The model is generalized in the obvious way in the estimation when I
focus on first-job choices only, recalling that the change in the total population of physicians
of either type is given by the population of new physicians of either type.
3.5.1 Physician Supply
I set up physicians’ choice of a location as a structural static discrete choice location. Physi-
cians pick a hospital referral region (HRR) to live in. The goal of HRRs is to define areas
that are self-contained markets for primary care, so that the majority of patients living in
that area go to primary care physicians within that area. Since physicians are picking the
location of their job, HRRs provide me with the area that will constitute their market for
medical procedures they will carry out. The outside choice is given by the HRRs that are
not picked by them every year.
61
Physicians are grouped into two main specialty divides: primary care and specialty care.
Individuals are heterogeneous along their specialty k and two demographic characteristics
`: the quality of the residency they completed as a proxy of their skill, q, and whether they
are foreign, f . The quality of the residency attended is used as a proxy of the skill level of
the physicians.
To approximate for the fact that higher-skilled residents have more options available to
them than their lower-skilled counterparts, I rank both jobs and individuals by their ranking.
The top 1% of physicians each year is the only group who has access to the top 1% jobs. Of
course, they are also able to pick any job that is lower-ranked than they are. The top 10%
physicians can pick any job that is equal or lower than their ranking. From the top 50%
onward, physicians can pick jobs that are immediately above their ranking or below theirs.
For example, a top 40% individual has all jobs that are below the 30% jobs in her choice
set. It is important to recall that since, in the estimation, locations are available so long as
jobs of the “correct” quality ranking are available within them, this assumption does not
bite for most physicians of higher qualities, and matters only for lower-quality physicians.
Cities do not only differ by the wages and the physician-type mix. They differ by the level
of amenities. I collect amenities on a variety of characteristics, grouped into seven main
categories: cost of housing, entertainment, safety, transportation, education, crime, and
environment. Amenities x jt are treated as exogenous in this setting (physicians are one
occupation only that will not influence the amenities in that location).
Finally, physicians display a preference for locations that are close to where they completed
their residency. Therefore, preferences of workers with the same demographic characteris-
tics ` for a HRR j can differ due to preferences to remain within the residency’s HRR and
state.
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As commonly done in the literature, I express physicians’ preferences as the indirect utility
function physicians receive when picking HRR j in year t. I suppressed the time index t
for ease of read. Residents pick a location within the whole nation, but they compete with
the graduates that are also picking a location in the same year. Recall that residents are
differentiated along their specialty group, their quality, and their foreign status.
I utilize the micro-data that I collected to let physicians differ in how they value the net in-
come offered in different locations. The endogeneity issue that is commonly present within
the mean utility parameters will then disappear, as compensation will not be contained in
the mean utility anymore and there are no restrictions imposed between the unobserved
amenities and the error term.
I let physicians differ in their preferences not only due to the location of their residency
and the idiosyncratic shock, but also due to the net income they receive. Since I know
the medical school physicians attended and I use this information to calculate the average
payment of student loans, physicians actually differ in the net income they would receive
in the same location. Therefore, the specification I run is the following:
max
j
ui j =
δ k, `j︷ ︸︸ ︷
β k, `x j+ξ k, `j +
µi j︷ ︸︸ ︷
αk, `yi j+β k, `j xi j+ εi j (8)
where
ui j =

δ k, `j mean utility
+µi j stochastic coefficients
+εi j iid T1EV error term
(9)
where k represents the specialty group of the physician (primary care vs. specialty) and `
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represents the demographics of the physicians, namely their quality ranking qi and their for-
eign status fi. x j are the location characteristics (the observed amenities), ξ k, lj are location-
year unobservables. yi j is net income, which includes, as mentioned before: the expected
wage income, the expected procedure revenue, the expected expenses (housing costs, mal-
practice insurance, student loans), and the expected subsidies (loan forgiveness affects the
amount of student loans, while salary incentives increase the expected wage income). The
εi j are drawn from Type 1 extreme value distribution and are independent and identically
distributed across physicians, locations, and years.
Then, the probability that a physician i of type ` in specialty k picks location j in a given
year is:
sˆi jt =
exp
{
δ k, `jt +µi jt
}
∑Mm=1 exp
{
δ k, `mt +µimt
} (10)
where M is equal to the number of HRRs.
The overall portion of doctors in specialty k picking location j in a given year across all
demographic characteristics can be found by summing the individual market shares across
the individuals within each type and across types. The number of primary care and specialty
care physicians in j at time t are respectively:
NPCjt = ∑
`∈q, f
NPC`t
∑
i=1
exp
{
δPC, `jt +µi jt
}
∑Mm=1 exp
{
δPC, `mt +µimt
}NPC`t (11)
NSPjt = ∑
`∈q, f
NSP`t
∑
i=1
exp
{
δ SP, `jt +µi jt
}
∑Mm=1 exp
{
δ SP, `mt +µimt
}NSP`t (12)
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Net income in the mean utility δk, `j The discrete-choice literature usually includes the
monetary value in the mean utility (for example, the product price in discrete choice models
for differentiated products). This is usually due the fact that the monetary value does not
differ by the individual i, as it is the case, for example, with cereal, where the price does
not differ by the purchaser. This same assumption has usually been kept in analyses where
the monetary value indeed varies for each individual, as it is the case here. I use the micro
data to calculate an average net income that would be available in a given location j for
physicians of type ` in specialty k and estimate the model again. This average net income
still includes all the elements present in the micro data (salary, reimbursements, housing
cost, malpractice insurance, student loans), but it simply represents what the average net
income is for a physician of type ` in specialty k in location j. I show in the results that
the coefficients found do not differ much from those found letting net income vary for each
individual. The correct measure of net income and the correct specification of the choice
sets are the key to the results found in this chapter.
Physician i in specialty k and with demographic characteristics of type ` then solves:
max
j
ui j =
δ k, `j︷ ︸︸ ︷
αk, `y j+β k, `x j+ξ k, `j +
µi j︷ ︸︸ ︷
β k, `j xi j+ εi j (13)
where
(
y j, x j
)
are now the location characteristics (net income as defined in Section 3.1
and amenities, respectively), while everything else follows exactly as above.
The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) Notice that the IIA property does
not hold here. First, the individual preferences µi j allow for correlation in preferences
within areas and within states due to physicians’ preferences to have a preference to remain
close to their residency. Within each area, preferences vary by specialty and by `, therefore
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breaking the IIA property within each region.
3.5.2 Physician Demand
I model health firms in the city to use capital as well as a composition of primary care
and specialty care workers, so that the composition of the two types in a city matters quite
greatly for production. The reasoning for this is to imagine physicians as employed by clin-
ics/hospitals/physician offices, which use machinery as capital and a given mix of primary
care and specialty care physicians to produce a given health good, which I assume, for now,
to be one and homogenous in production across the two types.
The productivity of primary care and specialty care physicians depends on the mix between
the two types, due to the fact that the type of work carried out by primary care highly de-
pends on whether or not specialty care is already carried out in a given location (Falcettoni
2017).7 Physicians then receive a wage as well as fee-for-service reimbursements, the sum
of which determines the total compensation. Reimbursements, and therefore compensa-
tion, depend on the specific procedures carried out. The wage endogenously responds to
changes in physician employment, while reimbursements endogenously respond to the mix
of types of physicians in the city. The wage is also impacted by the changes in the physi-
cian’s productivity caused, once again, by the ratio between primary and specialty care
physicians. Therefore, total compensation clearly responds to changes in the employment
of either type of physicians. Physicians could also be self-employed. This set-up can easily
include self-employment by imagining the physician to be simply employed in her own
firm. Since I observe whether or not physicians are in an office or in a facility setting, I can
easily allocate income correctly.
7Recall the discussion in Section 4 summarizing the main findings in Chapter 2 on physicians’ procedures by
specialty and area.
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Each Hospital Referral Region j produces a medical good through a high number of ho-
mogenous firms (index suppressed) that employ primary care physicians (NPCjt ) and special-
ists (NSPjt ) and use machinery (capital K jt). Production follows a Cobb-Douglas function
where the total number of doctors employed (D jt) follows a CES function:
M jt = DαjtK
1−α
jt (14)
D jt =
(
θPCjt
(
NPCjt
)ρ
+θ SPjt
(
NSPjt
)ρ) 1ρ
(15)
θPCjt = fPC
(
NPCjt ,N
SP
jt
)
exp
(
εPCjt
)
(16)
θ SPjt = fSP
(
NPCjt ,N
SP
jt
)
exp
(
εSPjt
)
(17)
which leads to the usual elasticity of substitution between primary care physicians and
specialists of 11−ρ . Notice This setup for physician demand is borrowed from the extensive
literature on the wage differential between high- and low-skilled workers, such as Katz and
Murphy (1992) and, more recently, Diamond (2015).
θ kjt ∀k = PC, SP is the productivity of primary care physicians and specialists. The two
error terms are the exogenous factors that affect the productivity levels, while the function
that takes into consideration the employment of either type of physicians endogenously
affects the productivity of either type. This setup works well in my model since primary
care physicians behave differently and can carry out different procedures when specialists
are not around. Therefore, their productivity highly depends on the number of physicians
of either type within a location. The two functions are not specified by a parametric form
to not make strong assumptions on the way that the number of physicians directly impacts
productivity.
Since the firms are perfectly competitive, they hire until total compensation is equal to the
marginal product of labor. The capital market is assumed to be frictionless and national, so
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that firms can get capital at price pt , equal across all locations. Finally, since firms are ho-
mogenous and the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the firm problem is representative
to each location’s physician demand. Solving the above problem and log-linearizing:
compPCjt = at +(1−ρ)d jt +(ρ−1)nPCjt + log
(
fPC
(
NPCjt ,N
SP
jt
))
+ εPCjt (18)
compSPjt = at +(1−ρ)d jt +(ρ−1)nSPjt + log
(
fSP
(
NPCjt ,N
SP
jt
))
+ εSPjt (19)
D jt =
(
fPC
(
NPCjt ,N
SP
jt
)
exp
(
εPCjt
)(
NPCjt
)ρ
+ fSP
(
NPCjt ,N
SP
jt
)
exp
(
εSPjt
)(
NSPjt
)ρ) 1ρ
(20)
where lowercase letters stand for log-variables, comp is the logarithm of the total com-
pensation physicians receive (salary and reimbursements) and at is a constant, given by:
at = log
(
α
(
(1−α)
pt
) 1−α
α
)
.
The physician demand equations can be approximated with log-linear aggregate physician
demand, as commonly done in the labor literature:
compPCjt = β0,pc+ γ
pc
pcn
PC
jt + γ
pc
sp n
SP
jt + ε
PC
jt (21)
compSPjt = β0,sp+ γ
sp
pcn
PC
jt + γ
sp
spn
SP
jt + ε
SP
jt (22)
where the total compensation and employment in each j are data, while the errors are un-
observed, and γ pcpc , γ pcsp , γsppc , γspsp are the parameters to be estimated.
3.5.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is given by a set of wages and quantity of physicians for every location j
in every year t :
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(
compPC∗jt , comp
SP∗
jt , N
PC
jt
∗, NSPjt
∗
)
∀ j,t
such that:
1. Demand for primary care physicians equals supply of primary care physicians in each
city: 
NPCjt
∗ = ∑`∈q, f ∑
NPC`t
i=1
exp
{
δPC, `jt +µi jt
}
∑Mm=1 exp
{
δPC, `mt +µimt
}NPC`t
compPCjt = β0,pc+ γ
pc
pcnPCjt
∗
+ γ pcsp nSPjt + ε
PC
jt
nPCjt
∗
= logNPCjt
∗
(23)
2. Demand for specialists equals supply of specialists in each city:

NSPjt
∗
= ∑`∈q, f ∑
NSP`t
i=1
exp
{
δ SP, `jt +µi jt
}
∑Mm=1 exp
{
δ SP, `mt +µimt
}NSP`t
compSPjt = β0,sp+ γ
sp
pcnPCjt + γ
sp
spnSPjt
∗
+ εSPjt
nSPjt
∗
= logNSPjt
∗
(24)
3. The compensation clears the market:

compPC∗jt = β0,pc+ γ
pc
pcnPCjt
∗
+ γ pcsp nSP∗jt + ε
PC
jt
compSP∗jt = β0,sp+ γ
sp
pcnPC∗jt + γ
sp
spnSPjt
∗
+ εSPjt
(25)
Recall that total compensation is contained in the δ k, `jt ’s as part of the net income received
by physicians.
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3.6 Estimation
3.6.1 Amenity Index
The computation of the amenity index follows Diamond (2015). The amenity index is
meant to capture all the different amenity bundles available in different places. To approx-
imate for such bundle as closely as possible, I include eight different categories: clothing
stores, educational amenities, environment, health facilities, crime, transportation facilities,
long commute, and traffic. Recall that job availability and the characteristics of the patients
available are analyzed separately from this index.
Clothing stores per capita is calculated using the U.S. Census data on apparel stores; educa-
tion includes the county spending per pupil up to secondary school as well as state spending
per capita on libraries, primary, and secondary schools; environment includes the invest-
ment in parks and green spaces, the number of parks, the number of days marked with pol-
lution, the median level of pollution, the number of good, moderate, and unhealthy days as
measured by the EPA (using the air quality index); the health facility index includes invest-
ment in hospitals and health facilities; crime includes the number of correction facilities,
violent crimes, murders, rapes, robberies, aggravated assaults, property crimes, burglar-
ies, thefts, and motor thefts per capita; transportation facilities includes highways, airports,
parkings, and harbors per capita; commute includes the percentage of people within the
area commuting, by length of commute, from up to 14 minutes to over an hour; finally,
traffic includes the percentage of people that commute by car, by length of commute, to
proxy for the number of cars that would be in an area. I use principal component analysis
(PCA) based on correlation (due to the different scales of the variables) to build the index.
I extract the first component for each of the components of each index first, and I then run
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PCA again on the individual categories mentioned above to generate the full amenity index.
Each individual index correctly puts the right weight on the single components. Envi-
ronment puts negative weight on the days with pollution, the median level of pollution,
moderate, and unhealthy days, correctly picking up that those factors decrease the quality
of the air, while all other factors improve it. Long commute puts a negative weight on
short commutes up to 24 minutes, with factor loadings increasing in the time of commute,
correctly picking up that short commutes decrease the commute length, and more so, the
shorter the commute. Traffic puts a negative weight on short commutes by car below 20
minutes, correctly picking up that areas in which people commute little by car to get to
work are characterized by less traffic. All the other indices put positive weights on the
different factors, correctly picking up that they each contribute to the index itself.
I finally run PCA again on the single indices to create the amenity index used in the chapter.
The index for both specialty groups is presented in Table 3. The index is able to capture
that crime, a long commute, and traffic are negative attributes of an area. It is also able to
capture that, instead, a high number of stores, a high quality of the environment, and a high
investment in education, health facilities, and transportation are all positive attributes of an
area. To check that this is in fact correct, I rank the hospital referral regions according to
the index level. The amenity index ranked HRRs inside and around New York, Chicago,
DC, San Francisco, and Seattle all at the top of the list. Those cities are all places generally
considered to have a high level of amenity, reinforcing the validity of the index.
3.6.2 Instrumental Variables
I use Bartik (1991) instruments to be able to identify my parameters of interest. Bartik
shocks are generally defined as local labor demand shocks driven by the share of the city’s
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Table 3.8: Amenity Index
Variables First Components, Primary Care First Components, Specialists
Clothing Stores 0.0525 0.0578
Education 0.4828 0.4764
Environment 0.3529 0.3800
Health 0.4595 0.4716
Crime -0.0201 -0.0273
Transportation 0.4550 0.4620
Long Commute to Work -0.3257 -0.3038
Traffic -0.3392 -0.3207
Notes: These results come from the estimation of the amenity index discussed in the chapter. Each value represents
the first components obtained through principal component analysis (using correlation). First, I run principal component
analysis on the single categories. Then I run principal component analysis again on the single categories to obtain the first
components shown in this table, representing the weight of each category on the final index. More details are available
in the text. The first components of each category are available in the online appendix.
employment in that industry with respect to the importance of that same industry nationally.
Bartik instruments are therefore able to measure the change in a region’s labor demand that
is induced by changes in the national demand for different industries’ products.
Following this logic, I will utilize my micro data on physicians’ transactions at the proce-
dure level for Medicare to be able to identify labor demand shocks that are uncorrelated
with labor supply shocks. The identifying assumption in this setting is that labor demand
is procedure-specific, while labor supply is not. In other words, for example, patients care
about having someone carrying out an EKG, if they do not have it already, more than X-
Rays, if someone already carries those out, but the physician herself, already assigned to a
specialty, does not have a procedure-specific taste.
In order for this to hold, the rates I consider have to be exogenous, otherwise other issues of
endogeneity could be present. The reason I utilize reimbursement rates is that reimburse-
ment rates are set by policy. Reimbursement rates change for the whole nation according to
the decisions made by the reimbursement committee. This allows me to evaluate the mone-
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tary impact of the productivity shocks on procedures through the shock on reimbursements:
BSPjt,reimb = ∑
q∈treatments
NSP,qj,t−k
∑q′N
SP,q′
j,t−k
log
(
∑m 6= j reimb
SP,q
m,t
∑m 6= j reimb
SP,q
m,t−k
)
(26)
BPCjt,reimb = ∑
q∈treatments
NPC,qj,t−k
∑q′N
PC,q′
j,t−k
log
(
∑m 6= j reimb
PC,q
m,t
∑m6= j reimb
PC,q
m,t−k
)
(27)
which can be written in an equivalent way as:
BSPjt,reimb = ∑
q∈treatments
NSP,qj,t−k
NSPj,t−k
(
reimb
SP,q
m 6= j,t− reimbSP,qm6= j,t−k
)
(28)
BPCjt,reimb = ∑
q∈treatments
NPC,qj,t−k
NPCj,t−k
(
reimb
PC,q
m 6= j,t− reimbPC,qm6= j,t−k
)
(29)
where
NSP,qj,t−k
NSPj,t−k
is the share of specialists carrying out procedure q at the beginning of the pe-
riod in HRR i and
NPC,qj,t−k
NPCj,t−k
is, equivalently, the share of primary care physicians carrying out
procedure q in 2012 in HRR i, while
(
reimb
SP,q
j 6=i,t− reimbSP,qj 6=i,t−k
)
is the growth in average
reimbursement to specialists for procedure q between 2012 and 2016 in all other HRRs but
HRR i, and
(
reimb
PC,q
j 6=i,t− reimbPC,qj 6=i,t−k
)
is the equivalent measure for primary care physi-
cians.
Instrument validity This instrument will be valid, relevant, and exogenous under the
following restrictions:
1. There needs to be enough variation in the national growth rates across different proce-
dures (i.e.
(
reimb
SP,q
j 6=i,t− reimbSP,qj 6=i,t−k
)
and
(
reimb
PC,q
j 6=i,t− reimbPC,qj 6=i,t−k
)
are different
for different q ).
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This is easily respected because rate changes are set by policy and the reimbursement
rates are different for different procedures, so there are enough changes across the 5
years considered for this to hold.
2. There needs to be enough variation in the share of physicians carrying out procedure
q across areas j (
NSP,qi,t−k
NSPi,t−k
,
NPC,qi,t−k
NPCi,t−k
are different for different i), or in other words, the mix
of procedures carried out has to vary by location.
3. The exclusion restrictions have to be respected:
(a) No procedure q is concentrated in one area only.
(b) There is no supply effect or shock that drives the Bartik instrument.
Therefore, I need to test the key identifying assumption that there is enough variation in the
procedure mix carried out in different places and that these differences in the procedure mix
are uncorrelated with location unobservables. First, as shown in Figure 4, the instrument
created displays high variation across and within urbanity types.
Second, the exogeneity of the instrument could be challenged thinking that differences in
the procedure mix carried out by physicians are correlated with the same characteristics that
make people decide to live in different locations. This is exactly why I exploit the changes
in the policy reimbursement rates and the procedure count observed across the years in my
data. Since the instrument is calculated using the time changes observed between 2012
and 2016, it is unlikely that unobserved location amenities are systematically correlated
to these changes across time. Even though I run a two-step simultaneous GMM, I run
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Figure 3.6: Income Instrument Density by Urbanity Index
Notes: This figure shows density distribution of the income instrument created, across and within urbanity types. Source: CMS.
a 2SLS estimation to get a feeling of the first-stage regression results and determine the
instrument strength. The F-Stats are high (~68), suggesting that the instrument performs
well in income prediction. The full estimation passes the overidentification Hansen’s J-test
as well, with a p-value equal to 0.4182 in the first case and 0.4049 in the other. The rule of
thumb is that a high p-value indicates a good model fit, and a p-value that is not too high
suggests that there are no other issues related to the model.
Finally, the Bartik demand shocks are unrelated to local city characteristics since they are
built based on national shocks to the physicians’ reimbursement level. Since I also inter-
act them with malpractice insurance premia, notice that changes in the malpractice insur-
ance premia do not depend on the attractiveness of the city, but vary substantially within
and across locations. Simultaneous estimation guarantees identification thanks to the in-
struments’ ability to affect all endogenous variables at the same time and simultaneously
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identify the parameters of interest.
3.6.3 Physician Supply
The estimation of physicians’ preferences is a two-step estimation procedure, following
BLP (1995). First, I use maximum likelihood to identify how much physicians of either
type in each year want to live in each location, obtaining the mean utility level for each loca-
tion
(
δ k, `j
)
and the individual coefficients (contained in µi j). Recall that in the estimation,
β k, `j is a vector of two parameters, representing the semi-elasticity of demand with respect
to whether the location chosen is within the same state
(
β k, `state
)
and area
(
β k, `HRR
)
of resi-
dency. I then use these in the second step to estimate the trade-off physicians face between
wages and other characteristics in their location choice through simultaneous equation non-
linear GMM, using moments on physicians’ preferences and physician’s demand. Standard
errors are clustered by hospital referral region.
Maximum likelihood estimation to recover δk, `jt , α
k, `, βk, `j
Let Ii j be a dummy variable that takes value one if physician i chooses location j. Recall
that the probability that a physician i of type ` in specialty k picks location j in a given year
is:
sˆk, `i jt =
exp
{
δ k, `jt +α
k, `yi jt+β k, `j xi jt+ εi jt
}
∑Mm=1 exp
{
δ k, `mt +αk, `yimt+β
k, `
m ximt+ εimt
} (30)
Recall that the same apparent “compensation offer” in a location is perceived differently
by different individuals, as they each carry their level of student loans and expenses. By
utilizing the micro-data, the net income variable is calculated for each individual exactly.
Through this methodology, individuals of the same type ` are still allowed to differ in their
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preferences for locations according to the total net income that they individually would face
in each location. The log-likelihood function is then given by:
L k, `
(
δ k, `jt , β
k, `
j
)
=
1
Nk`
Nk`
∑
i=1
J
∑
j=1
Ii j log
(
sˆk, `i jt
(
δ k, `jt , β
k, `
j ;yi j, xi j
))
(31)
This log-likelihood cannot be estimated directly because it would require a search over
J+ 1 parameters (which is problematic, since J>300). Therefore, I instead use the BLP
(1995) contraction that finds the parameters of interest by matching the observed shares in
the data sk, `jt to the estimated shares sˆ
k, `
i jt
(
δ k, `jt , β
k, `
j
)
:
T
(
δ k, `j
)
= δ k, `j +[log
(
sk, `j
)
− log
(
sˆk, `j
(
δ k, `j , β
k, `
j
))
(32)
which reduces the estimation considerably, since for every β k, `j , there exists a unique δ
k, `
j =(
δ k, `1 , ...,δ
k, `
J
)
that matches the observed and estimated shares. The log-likelihood is then
given by:
L k, `
(
δ k, `
(
β k, `j
)
,β k, `j
)
=
1
Nk`
Nk`
∑
i=1
J
∑
j=1
Ii j log
(
sˆk, `i jt
(
δ k, `
(
β k, `j
)
,β k, `j ;yi j, xi j
))
(33)
The recovered δ k, `j are now simply given by the amenities of a location, i.e. the common
component of the utility that individuals within each type agree upon. The second stage
then allows me to recover ξ k, `jt .
Net income in the mean utility δk, `j Here, I briefly show what varies in the estima-
tion procedure if I allow for an average compensation by location that is invariant at the
individual level.
First step: maximum likelihood estimation to recover δk, `jt , β
k, `
j
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Let Ii j be a dummy variable that takes value one if physician i chooses location j. Recall
that the probability that a physician i of type ` in specialty k picks location j in a given year
is:
sˆk, `i jt =
exp
{
δ k, `jt +β
k, `
j xi jt+ εi jt
}
∑Mm=1 exp
{
δ k, `mt +β
k, `
m ximt+ εimt
} (34)
The discussion above on the log-likelihood remains valid here, therefore I use the con-
traction mapping from BLP (1995) as above, so that for every β k, `j , there exists a unique
δ k, `j =
(
δ k, `1 , ...,δ
k, `
J
)
that matches the observed and estimated shares. The log-likelihood
is then given by:
L k, `
(
δ k, `
(
β k, `j
)
,β k, `j
)
=
1
Nk`
Nk`
∑
i=1
J
∑
j=1
Ii j log
(
sˆk, `i jt
(
δ k, `
(
β k, `j
)
,β k, `j ; xi j
))
(35)
Second step: two-step GMM to recover αk, `, βk, `, ξ k, `j
Now that both β k, `j and δ
k, `
j =
(
δ k, `1 , ...,δ
k, `
J
)
are recovered, all that is left to be estimated
are the parameters on the net income αk, ` and on the amenities β k, `.
The key issue in this part of the estimation is the endogeneity caused by the unobserved
amenities ξ j. While I include many amenities in the amenity index I discussed in Section
6.1, there could be other unobserved amenities that still impact physicians’ choices. One
such example is the fact that physicians might pick places surrounded by people that are
similar to them. Due to the fact that physicians are paid more where amenities are fewer and
that reimbursements vary geographically due to the discussion in Chapter 2 summarized
in Section 3.1, the correlation between net income and unobserved amenities is strictly
negative, i.e.
E
[
y jξ k, `j
]
< 0 (36)
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This would bias αk, ` downward, as it can easily be verified by running a simple OLS
regression, which estimates negative coefficients on income.
I utilize the income instrument discussed in Section 6.2 to address this issue. The iden-
tifying assumption is that there is enough variation in the procedure mix carried out in
different places and that these differences in the procedure mix are uncorrelated with loca-
tion unobservables. In formal notation:
E
[
Bkjt,reimbξ
k, `
j
]
= 0 (37)
3.6.4 Physician Demand
Recall the labor demand equations:
compPCjt = β0,pc+ γ
pc
pcn
PC
jt + γ
pc
sp n
SP
jt + ε
PC
jt (38)
compSPjt = β0,sp+ γ
sp
pcn
PC
jt + γ
sp
spn
SP
jt + ε
SP
jt (39)
and take the difference of the variables from the base values in 2012, utilizing the panel
dimension of the data:
∆compPCjt = γ
pc
pc∆n
PC
jt + γ
pc
sp∆n
SP
jt +∆ε
PC
jt (40)
∆compSPjt = γ
sp
pc∆n
PC
jt + γ
sp
sp∆n
SP
jt +∆ε
SP
jt (41)
As mentioned before, ∆εPCjt and ∆ε
SP
jt represent the exogenous changes in the wages (the
exogenous productivity changes). Since, by definition, the Bartik instruments above are
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demand shifters, I can write:

∆εPCjt = γ
pc,inst
pc BPCjt,reimb+ γ
pc,inst
sp BSPjt,reimb+∆η
PC
jt
∆εSPjt = γ
sp,inst
pc BPCjt,reimb+ γ
sp,inst
sp BSPjt,reimb+∆η
SP
jt
(42)
where ∆ηPCjt and ∆η
SP
jt are unobserved changes in the productivity change which are, by
construction, uncorrelated with the demand shocks captured by the Bartik instruments. I
can then redefine the labor demand equations as:

∆compPCjt = γ
pc
pc pc jt+ γ pcsp sp jt+ γ pc,instpc ∆BPCjt,reimb+ γ
pc,inst
sp ∆BSPjt,reimb+∆η
PC
jt
∆compSPjt = γ
sp
pc pc jt+ γspsp sp jt+ γsp,instpc ∆BPCjt,reimb+ γ
sp,inst
sp ∆BSPjt,reimb+∆η
SP
jt
(43)
where, as before, the physician demand elasticities γki ∀i,k = pc,sp are the parameters of
interest. These are identified using changes in physician supply which are not correlated
with ∆ηPCjt and ∆η
SP
jt . I will use the interaction of the Bartik instruments (which are un-
correlated with ∆ηPCjt and ∆η
SP
jt by construction) with region-based malpractice insurance
reimbursement units. The malpractice units, also set by Medicare, are set by procedure and
location, based on observed malpractice insurance premia, and they therefore proxy for the
total malpractice insurance cost paid by physicians. The location adjustments, called geo-
graphical practice cost indices, which are set differently for work units and reimbursement
units, react to the increase in the cost of life of the location. Now, take two cities with
the same increase in physician demand, but that experience different changes in the total
malpractice insurance costs. The city that experiences the higher cost increase will be less
desirable to physicians, at an equal demand. This analysis will remain valid as long as the
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exclusion restrictions remain respected:
E
(
∆ηPCjt ∆Z jt
)
= 0 (44)
E
(
∆ηSPjt ∆Z jt
)
= 0 (45)
where ∆Z jt ∈
{
∆Bkjt,reimb∆MPGPCI jt , ∆B
k
jt,reimb∆MP
k′
jt ∀k,k′ = pc,sp
}
. Once again, recall that
E
(
∆ηPCjt ∆B
PC
jt,reimb
)
= 0 (46)
E
(
∆ηSPjt ∆B
SP
jt,reimb
)
= 0 (47)
by construction.
Recall that all parameters of the demand model are estimated jointly with the supply pa-
rameters in the second step described above.
3.7 Results
3.7.1 Physician Supply
Table 4 presents the results for physicians’ preferences in their choice of location, both for
primary care (first panel) and specialists (second panel). In general, physicians like higher
net incomes and higher amenities. Top-50 coefficients are generally noisier and indicate
small differences. Top-50 primary care physician residents are more likely to be retained
in the same state as residency, unlike specialty residents. Residents in all specialties are
less likely to be retained in the same area as residency if they are from a top residency.
Specialists are more elastic to income than primary care physicians. Top-50 residents are
less elastic to income, even though the estimate is quite small. Overall, the elasticities
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Table 3.9: Physician Supply: Individual Preferences (β k,`, αk,`, β k,`state, β
k,`
HRR)
Amenities Amenities, Top 50 Amenities, Foreign
PC SP PC SP PC SP
β k,` 0.39 0.59 0.20 0.25 0.01 0.04
(0.018) (0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006)
Income Income, Top 50 Income, Foreign
PC SP PC SP PC SP
αk,` 0.03 0.15 -0.005 -0.023 -0.001 0.001
(1.18e-06) (7.57e-06) (2.58e-06) (1e-05) (0.001) (0.001)
State State, Top 50
PC SP PC SP
β k,`state 2.77 1.75 0.42 -0.38
(0.012) (0.035) (0.018) (0.053)
HRR HRR, Top 50
PC SP PC SP
β k,`HRR 2.35 2.57 -1.48 -0.29
(0.005) (0.042) (0.008) (0.063)
Notes: These results come from the second specification of the physician supply analysis described in the chapter. Magnitude of the α represents
the elasticity of demand of a location with respect to income. Magnitude of the state and HRR coefficients represent the semielasticity of demand
with respect to whether the choice is within the same state or area (HRR) of residency, respectively. The coefficients are obtained through maximum
likelihood estimation of the conditional logit model based on individual-level data on residency and choice locations. The sample includes all residents
finishing residency, by specialty, between 2012 and 2016. The choice set is given by the set of hospital referral regions in the United States as defined
by Dartmouth Atlas.
displayed are very small, confirming that small monetary efforts such as those executed up
to now to bring doctors to rural areas cannot be effective.
As mentioned beforehand, this estimation allows me to recover the unobserved amenities
from the contraction mapping. The density distribution of the recovered unobserved ameni-
ties is shown in Figure 5. As expected, cities have higher unobserved amenities than rural
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Figure 3.7: Density of Amenities, by Location Type
Notes: This figure shows the density distribution of the amenities implied by the model (both observed and unobserved), by location
type. As expected, cities have higher amenity levels than rural areas.
places.
Preference for Retention Table 4 also reports the results for physicians’ preferences for
retention. Physicians display a preference for locations that are close to where they com-
pleted their residency. Therefore, preferences of workers with the same demographic char-
acteristics k, ` for a HRR j can differ due to preferences to remain within the residency’s
HRR and state. This is motivated by two facts in the health literature: first, many physi-
cians that want to return to their state of birth tend to pick a residency that already fulfills
their preference, so this preference also proxies for a preference to return to the birthplace;
secondly, many medical students initiate personal relationships during residency that lead
to their choice of remaining close to their residency location (often due to the fact that
their spouse is not in the medical profession, for example). These two facts lead to a third,
widely discussed fact: many states display high rates of residency retention, with 54% of
all residents in the US remaining within their state of residency for their first job. My data
sample replicates this fact, with 51.4% of doctors picking to remain within the same state
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of residency.
Table 4 shows the estimates from the maximum likelihood estimation of the conditional
logit model displaying the semi-elasticity of demand with respect to whether or not the
choice is within the same state of residency first, and within the same hospital referral
region after. I find that primary care physicians are about 3.8 times more likely to work
in the same state as their residency and about 3.4 times more likely to work in the same
hospital referral region as their residency. Similarly, specialists are 2.8 times more likely
to work in the same state as their residency and about 3.6 times more likely to remain in
the same hospital referral region for work. I am able to reject that retention values can
be the same between primary care physicians and specialists. The appendix reports the
semi-elasticity of retention estimates on a year-by-year basis.
I compare the base estimates with those of individuals that attended a top-50 residency. I
find that top-50 residents in primary care are 0.4 times more likely to remain in the same
state as their residency for work, but they are 1.5 times less likely to remain in the same area
as residency. On the other hand, I find that top-50 residents in specialty care are 0.3-0.4
times less likely to be retained within the same state and area of residency.
This preference for retention agrees with the previous survey literature on physicians’
choice of location (including, but not limited to, Cooper 1975), supporting and strengthen-
ing the literature’s survey findings.
Comparing these results to the labor literature, I find a very interesting result. While all
physicians are clearly high-skilled workers, primary care physicians display the same pref-
erence of retention as unskilled workers. Diamond (2015), for example, reports a base
semi-elasticity of college of workers of being retained in their state of birth of about 2.6.
That estimate is closer to the values I find for specialists, but much lower than the values
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that I find for primary care physicians. This shows that there are extremely important differ-
ences not only across occupation types, but also within occupations that might be ignored
in current analyses.
Net income in the mean utility δk, `j
As mentioned earlier in the text, I also run the model again using the micro data to calculate
the average income that a physician would receive in a given location to compare it to
the existing literature. I then run two different specifications of the model in which net
income is a component of the mean utility. First, I assume that the demand elasticities
are only a function of the elasticity of labor substitution between primary care physicians
and specialists (Model 1). In the second specification, I relax this assumption and I let
compensation respond to the employment of either type of physician (Model 2). The results
are shown to be robust, indicating that a comprehensive measure of income is the main
driver for the results.
Table 5 presents the results for physicians’ preferences in their choice of location, both for
primary care (first panel) and specialists (second panel). In general, physicians like higher
net incomes and higher amenities. Top-50 residents are more elastic to both, while I do
not observe significant differences between American and foreign physicians. Specialists
are more elastic than primary care physicians with respect to both factors. As mentioned
beforehand, the two specifications in Table 5 only vary on the demand side. I find that the
elasticity that primary care physicians display is very similar in both cases. Specialists’
elasticity to income is about double the elasticity found when the coefficient is estimated
using the individual-level data. I find that primary care physicians are about 3.7 times more
likely to pick a job within the same state of residency and about 3.4 times more likely
to pick a job within the same hospital referral region as the residency. On the other hand,
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specialists are 3 times more likely to pick a job within the same state as residency and about
2.8 times more likely to pick a job within the same hospital referral region. I am able to
reject that retention values can be the same between primary care physicians and specialists.
The appendix reports the semi-elasticity of retention estimates on a year-by-year basis.
I compare the base estimates with those of individuals that attended a top-50 residency.
These last estimates seem to be more noisy. I cannot conclude that top-50 primary care
residents have a different value to remain within the same area of residency, but top-50
primary care residents have a lower value to remain within the same state. Top-50 specialty
residents display a lower value of retention, and they are about 0.3-0.4 times less likely to
be retained at the hospital referral region- and state-level.
3.7.2 Physician Demand
Table 6 presents the parameter estimates for physician demand. The estimated elasticity of
labor substitution is quite high, equal to 1.01. The other specification allows for not only
the labor substitution between the two types of physicians, but also for the effect of varying
the employment of either type of physician. I observe a negative own-elasticity of primary
care physicians’ wages, but a positive own-elasticity of specialists’ wages, suggesting that
the specialists “feed off each other.”
Finally, I observe a negative elasticity of specialists’ wages with respect to primary care
employment, as suggested by my discussion in Chapter 2.
3.8 Counterfactuals
Policymakers have historically used different monetary incentives to attract doctors to rural
areas, most notably loan forgiveness and bonus incentives. The average sign-up bonus for
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Table 3.10: Physician Supply: Income in the Mean Utility (δ k,`j t)
(1 - Base) (1 - Top 50) (1 - Foreign)
PC SP PC SP PC SP
Compensation 0.043 0.074 0.019 0.020 -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Amenities 0.39 0.59 0.20 0.25 0.01 0.04
(0.018) (0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006)
Hansen’s J stat 172.23
p-value 0.3339
(2 - Base) (2 - Top 50) (2 - Foreign)
PC SP PC SP PC SP
Compensation 0.036 0.065 0.016 0.015 -0.0004 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001)
Amenities 0.49 0.73 0.24 0.29 0.001 0.047
(0.019) (0.026) (0.014) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
β k,`state 2.71 2.01 -0.35 -0.23
(0.041) (0.037) (0.069) (0.050)
β k,`HRR 2.40 1.79 -0.08 -0.36
(0.046) (0.041) (0.079) (0.058)
Hansen’s J stat 143.95
p-value 0.462
Notes: These results come from the physician supply analysis described in the chapter. Magnitude of all rows but the last two represents the
elasticity of the mean utility to each variable, by specialty group. Magnitude of the last two rows represents the semielasticity of demand with
respect to whether the choice is within the same state or area (HRR) of residency, respectively. The coefficients on individual preferences and the
mean utility levels are obtained through maximum likelihood estimation of the conditional logit model based on individual-level data on residency
and choice locations. The coefficients on the mean utility are obtained through two-step generalized method of moments. The coefficients for
top-50 and foreign residents are the differential effects of residents that graduated from a top-50 place and from being foreign with respect to the
base coefficients. The sample includes all residents finishing residency, by specialty, between 2012 and 2016. The choice set is given by the set of
hospital referral regions in the United States as defined by Dartmouth Atlas. Compensation is net income defined as revenues coming from salary
and reimbursements minus the expenses coming from malpractice insurance, rent, and student loan repayment. Health professional shortage areas
that offer loan forgiveness exclude student loan repayment. I also let the individual preference parameters vary by year in a robustness check. The
results from this estimation are available in the appendix.
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Table 3.11: Physician Demand
(1) (2)
ρ 1.01
(0.004)
γ pcpc -0.55
(0.06)
γ pcsp 0.51
(0.05)
γspsp 0.16
(0.05)
γsppc -0.19
(0.05)
Notes: These results come from the physician demand analysis described in the chapter. ρ represents the elasticity of labor substitution
between primary care physicians and specialists in specifications (1) and (2) in the model. All γs represent the reduced-form coefficient
determining the relationship between the employment of either type of physicians and their wages. All coefficients from the physician
demand analysis are jointly estimated with the physician supply parameters of the main utility through two-step GMM.
a doctor to practice in rural areas has been estimated to be around $7,500.
I run three different counterfactuals under this setup: I evaluate the effect of current policies
compared to no incentives, I evaluate the effect of a policy that switches the focus from
loan forgiveness to salary incentives, and I evaluate the effect of a policy that only targets
primary care physicians through salary incentives.
First, I estimate that loan forgiveness alone has increased the number of new primary care
physicians choosing rural areas by 0.5% and of new specialists by 1.3%. Since loan for-
giveness is particularly attractive to those students with high loans, a resorting effect hap-
pens, where residents re-maximize their utility and pick rural areas when their loans are the
greatest, while those with lower loans move to the city as amenities offer a higher utility.
To illustrate, Table 7 shows the percentage change in the primary care physician population
with respect to the base case of no loan forgiveness in any area.
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Table 3.12: Counterfactual Effect, by Specialty Group
PC SP
Loan Forgiveness 0.7% 1.3%
Salary Incentives 0.2% 0.1%
Notes: The table reports the percentage changes in physician population, by spe-
cialty type. "Loan Forgiveness" only includes the effect of a loan forgiveness policy,
"Salary Incentives" includes the additional effect of a $7,500 salary incentives.
Second, I add a $7,500s bonus value in income by choosing rural areas. This effect adds
another 0.2% with respect to the primary care population and an another 0.1% with respect
to the specialist population in the world with only loan forgiveness. To illustrate again, the
counterfactual percentage change in the primary care physician population with respect to
the case of loan forgiveness only is also shown in Table 7.
These two exercises have replicated the effect of currently implemented policies. Regard-
less of specialty, the two current policies have led to a 1.2% increase in the number of
physicians picking rural areas. Results suggest that specialists respond the most to current
policies, which is mainly driven by the focus on loan forgiveness and the very high loans
faced by specialists. However, the infrastructure necessary for specialists to operate greatly
limits the opportunities for policy intervention, at least in the short-term.
The detailed information fed into my model allows me to also analyze the average quality
level of the physicians who are incentivized by these policies. I find that while loan forgive-
ness might appear as an attractive option to bring physicians to rural areas, the physicians
attracted there are in the bottom 25% of the quality ladder. This is mainly due to the fact
that the physicians who are most responsive to loan forgiveness are those with very high
debt. While attending top medical schools often leads to high student loans, it also gives
physicians access to top residencies and, subsequently, to the most remunerative jobs. On
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the other hand, private low-ranked medical schools also lead to high student debt, but they
are often followed by low-ranked residencies and low-quality jobs. Physicians who face
this situation then find themselves with high debt and low-quality job perspectives, which
incentivizes them to accept loan forgiveness whenever possible.
Given this, I run the experiment of using the US spending currently spent on medical stu-
dent loan forgiveness to increase the salary incentives offered for rural area employment
across all physicians. The evaluation of current and alternative policies is presented in
Table 8. While this experiment maintains the same level of spending, salary incentives
incentivize all physicians equally, not just those with high loans. US spending on loan
forgiveness is between $350 million and $400 million. The redistribution of this spending
as rural salary incentives across all physicians leads to an extra bonus of roughly $35,000
for each physician picking rural areas. I find that such a policy would lead to almost 6
times more primary care physicians picking rural areas. Since primary care physicians are
the main physician category that currently provides medical care to rural areas, and since
they do not need a particular infrastructure to do so, these results suggest that policymak-
ers should retarget spending from loan forgiveness to salary incentives and that offering
salary incentives to primary care physicians only would be even more effective. The switch
to salary incentives also allows for a more varied pool of physicians in terms of quality
ranking, increasing the overall average quality of physicians.
Finally, I run the same exercise of switching to salary incentives, but targeting primary care
physicians only. The increase in the primary care physician population is now substantial,
while a few specialists are lost compared to the “no incentives” world, due to the increased
competition coming from the rising primary care population.
These exercises served as an example to show how monetary incentives are currently not
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Table 3.13: Impact of Current and Alternative Policies, by Specialty Group
Policy Environment PC SP
Data: New Rural Physicians 1,039 1,060
Model
Current Policies 1,039 1,060
Remove All Incentives 971 773
Effect of Current Policies +68 +287
Effect of Alternative Policy 1 - Target All +407 +132
Effect of Alternative Policy 2 - Target Primary Care Only +1,029 -22
Notes: The table reports the impact of current and alternative policies on the physician population, by specialty type.
strong enough for physicians to move to rural areas. They also suggest that policies aimed
at the retargeting of spending from loan forgiveness to salary incentives would lead to al-
most 6 times more primary care physicians choosing rural areas. Finally, the pool of physi-
cians attracted would be of a better quality on average under salary incentives compared to
current policies.
3.9 Conclusion
This chapter used a combination of detailed and novel data to be able to assess the main
factors affecting physicians’ choice of location of their first job following residency.
This chapter overall suggested a few interesting results. Firstly, the results suggest that
physicians respond positively to compensation and amenities, as theory would suggest.
However, physicians do not respond much to monetary incentives. Specialists are more
elastic than primary care physicians and respond more to both higher compensation and
higher amenities. Nevertheless, none of the characteristics matter as much as the location of
their residency. Retention is key, and those retained from medical school have an extremely
91
low chance of moving away after residency. Thirdly, primary care physicians display the
same preference of retention as unskilled workers in the labor literature, suggesting that
specialists and primary care physicians are inherently different.
These results have great potential implications for policy-making: first, the results suggest
that short-term policies should focus on physicians respond to other factors more than to
compensation. The key mechanism to bring physicians to rural placements seems to be a
very clear one: residencies need to be made available, offered, and maintained rurally. Not
only it is much easier to retain than to attract physicians to a new location, but physicians
that complete their residencies in rural places have a 70% probability of remaining rural.
I find that primary care physicians are about 3.5 times more likely to pick a job within
the same state of residency and 4 times more likely to pick a job within the same hospital
referral region as the residency. On the other hand, specialists are about 2.5 times more
likely to pick a job within the same state as residency and about 3 times more likely to pick
a job within the same hospital referral region. I also find that top-50 residents are more
difficult to be retained, while I find extremely high estimates of retention of physicians that
completed their residency rurally. Due to the small sample problem, the standard errors
are not reliable for yearly estimates. I therefore look at the sample as a whole and find
that rural residents are at least one time more likely to be retained. Since that is estimated
using the whole sample across years, I consider this to be a lower bound on the retention
preference for rural residents.
I find that elasticities are, in fact, quite low, especially compared to those displayed by
similarly high-skilled workers.
Finally, I use the model to analyze the performance of current policies targeted at bringing
physicians to rural areas. I find that 0.5% more primary care residents and 1.3% more spe-
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cialists have picked rural areas due to loan forgiveness alone. Monetary incentives in the
form of bonus payments averaging $7,500 are responsible for a further 0.2% increase in
primary care physicians and 0.1% increase in specialists. By retargeting the spending cur-
rently used for loan forgiveness to higher salary incentives for rural employment, I find that
almost 6 times more primary care physicians would pick rural areas. Since primary care
physicians are the main physician category that currently provides medical care to rural ar-
eas, and since they do not need a particular infrastructure to do so, these results suggest that
policymakers should retarget spending from loan forgiveness to salary incentives and that
offering salary incentives to primary care physicians only would be even more effective.
The average quality of the physicians attracted under these higher salary incentives is also
better compared to loan forgiveness. Another possible policy intervention suggested by the
results on the high preference for retention is the use of these monetary incentives to create
rural residencies. Since the residency choice is not directly modeled in this chapter, this
question is outside the scope of this chapter but will be addressed in future work.
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Chapter 4
Physician Workforce Effect on Health
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4.1 Introduction
The effect of the physician workforce on health outcomes of the American population is
a key, yet still poorly understood relationship. Considering the proposals put forward by
policymakers, the American Medical Association, as well as the media, most interventions
at the policy level aimed at equalizing the health outcomes and health care effectiveness
across all areas in the Unites States rely on a higher presence of physicians, and in particular
of primary care physicians, in the areas that currently need them the most (see, i.a., Sandy et
al. 2009, Council on Graduate Medical Education 2010, Association of American Medical
Colleges 2019). Nevertheless, it is problematic to show a causal relationship between the
physician workforce and the health outcomes of the affected population. This chapter seeks
to partially fill this gap by providing a first step toward an identification strategy for the
effect of physicians on health, utilizing an instrumental variable strategy with exogenous
policy shocks as well as detailed micro-data on procedure revenue.
Due to the problematic nature of determining a causal relationship between physician
concentration and health outcomes, there is a substantial amount of studies of the cross-
sectional data evidence in the United States (see Macinko, Starfield, and Shi 2007 for a
comprehensive review of these studies; see Chang et al. 2011 for a data-based discussion
on the association between physician workforce and health). Such studies have been the
basis for a call for an increased physician ratio by policymakers and have been treated as
empirical proof that physicians lead to better health outcomes. Nevertheless, previous pa-
pers have been based on cross-sectional analysis of the differences in mortality and physi-
cian ratio across counties or states, with some controls such as income. The issue with an
approach that simply compares such geographical differences is that the unobserved and
uncontrolled factors that affect both the physician ratio and the mortality lead to biased
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estimates of the physician workforce coefficient and tend to bias it upward. This chapter
implements an instrumental-variable approach based on the procedures carried out in dif-
ferent areas which estimates a physician workforce effect on health equal to about 1/10 of
the estimates usually generated through standard linear regression.
To better understand the bias of the coefficient of the physician workforce, it is important to
realize two important data facts. First, mortality is higher in rural than in urban areas, across
and within all age groups and across and within all causes of deaths. To illustrate this, the
all-cause crude mortality rate in 2017 for large central metros was 722.8 compared to the
noncore (most rural) area mortality rate of 1,224.8 per 100,000 residents (CDC Wonder).
This holds within each age group and within each main cause of death. For example, 2011-
2013 all-age heart-disease mortality rate was 166.6 in urban areas and 195 in rural areas
(CDC Wonder). Second, as discussed in the previous Chapters 2 and 3, physicians are
concentrated in cities, and this is true within and across specialty groups. To illustrate,
as of 2013, there were approximately 68 primary care physicians per 100,000 residents in
rural areas, compared to an average of 84 primary care physicians per 100,000 residents
in urban areas (Petterson et al. 2013). Across specialists (in particular, surgeons), the
difference is even higher, with more than double as many providers in urban areas compared
to rural areas, with 131 specialists per 100,000 residents in rural areas and 312 providers per
100,000 residents in urban areas (National Center for Health Workforce Analysis 2014).
These facts clearly illustrate that cities both attract more physicians and healthier people,
but whether these two facts are causally related is not as obvious. There are many variables,
in fact, that are correlated with both the physician concentration and health outcomes. For
example, cities are on average richer and have a much higher level of amenities, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 3. Some of these amenities relate to health outcomes: some examples
can be the availability of gym, health and organic food stores, health advocacy groups
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and advertisement to raise awareness, health groups promoting exercise such as clubs and
availability of free workout groups (such as public yoga). However, the higher amenities,
as discussed in Chapter 3, also lead to a higher concentration of physicians. Since all these
omitted variables are positively correlated with both the physician concentration ratio and
with the population health outcomes, omitting them will bias the coefficient on the physi-
cian workforce upward with any regression analysis that does not take this endogeneity into
consideration.
Another important consideration regards the definitions of geography and of mortality used
across studies. First, this chapter will use hospital referral regions (HRRs) as its health
markets. HRRs are defined by the Dartmouth Atlas Center as the closest proxy to a medical
market, meaning that patients that live within an HRR tend to receive care within the HRR
the majority of the time. Second, it is important to account for the geographical differences
in age, gender, and race across the population, as not doing so also leads to mistakes in
the coefficient estimation. For example, the median age of adults living in rural areas is 51
years, compared with a median age of 45 for urban areas (Census Bureau 2016). With an
older population, mortality is necessarily higher due to age. Since cities tend to be younger,
and physicians are more often in cities, this yet-again biases the coefficient. Moreover, to
understand the impact of physicians on the mortality rate, it is simply important to account
for the different demographic trends. This chapter will utilize an age-race-gender adjusted
mortality rate in the analysis.
This chapter implements an instrumental-variable approach that exploits the great variation
in the procedures carried out across and within areas joint with the changes in the policy-
set fees for such procedures for both primary care physicians and specialists to instrument
for the physician concentration. The identifying assumptions for this approach are that the
instrument is well-correlated with the physician distribution and exogenous with respect to
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the health outcomes of patients. The first assumption is highly supported by the discussion
in Chapters 2 and 3, which show that physicians highly respond to the reimbursements they
receive in different areas. The second assumption is verified by looking at the known tests
on instrument validity. The instruments pass the Hansen-J , the Stock-Yogo , the CLR, and
the AR tests, and report a high F-test in the first-stage regression. All in all, the instruments
seem to perform well in the estimation. Results from the IV estimation indicate that an
increase in one more physician per 10,000 saves, on average, 4.5 lives based on an average
of 4,484 deaths per 100,000 residents.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents a literature
review on the topic; Section 4.3 introduces the datasets used in the chapter; Section 4.4
discusses the reduced-form approach used while Section 4.5 argues the validity of the iden-
tification strategy employed; Section 4.6 discusses the results; Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
This chapter primarily contributes to the vast academic literature and reports from policy
analysis addressing the relationship between the physician supply and health benefits in the
United States.
Numerous studies have been carried at different geographical levels. In particular, at a state
level, some of the studies carried out include Shi et al. (2012), Shi et al. (1999). Shi et
al. (2005a), Shi et al. (2004), Shi et al. (2003a), and Shi et al. (2003b); at the county
level, these include Joines et al. (2003), Shi et al. (2005b); at the metro-area level, these
include Shi et al. (2005c) and Shi et al. (2011); at the individual level, these include Shi
et al. (2002) and Shi et al. (2000). Other related papers, to mention a few, are Vogel
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and Ackermann (1998), Laditka (2004), Parchman (1994), Parchman and Culler (1999),
Ricketts et al. (2001), and Schreiber and Zielinski (1994), and Chang (2011). A beautifully
executed review and summary of these studies is available in Macinko, Starfield, and Shi
(2007). The key way that this chapter differentiates itself in the literature is the attempt to
determine causation using estimation methods that are common in applied microeconomics
and econometrics.
This chapter also contributed to the large number of reports that are carried out by the Coun-
cil on Graduate Medical Education and by the Association of American Medical Colleges
(for example, refer to Council on Graduate Medical Education 2010 and Association of
American Medical Colleges 2019). These institutions as well as related ones often publish
reports regarding the need for more physicians and projections on the demand for health-
care, with hints at the distribution of health outcomes and its correlation with the physician
supply.
Methodologically, this chapter builds on the standard and vast literature on instrumental
variable estimators.
4.3 Data
The geographical unit of study is a hospital referral region (HRR), as defined by the Health
Resources & Services Administration. The goal of HRRs is to define areas that are self-
contained markets for primary care, so that the majority of patients living in that area go
to primary care physicians within that area. The urban/rural classification follows the U.S.
Census Bureau definition according to the 2013 Census criteria.
The main source of data for this chapter comes from the Centers for Medicare & Med-
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icaid Services (CMS) and is the same data used in the other Chapters. A brief descrip-
tion is repeated here for convenience. The Physician and Other Supplier Public data pro-
vides information on services and procedures provided to Medicare beneficiaries by physi-
cians. It contains information on utilization, actual Medicare reimbursement, and submitted
charges. Each line of the dataset is indexed by a National Provider Identifier (NPI), which
identifies each doctor in the dataset, by a Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System
(HCPCS) code, which identifies every procedure carried out by each doctor, and by the
place of service, indicating whether the procedures were carried out in a facility setting or
not. The data is based on information from CMS administrative claims data for Medicare
beneficiaries enrolled in the fee-for-service program. The data are available for calendar
years 2012 through 2016 and contain the universe of physicians taking part in Medicare
Part B for the fee-for-service population. There are a little over 40 million observations
in the dataset across over a million of physicians in the panel. This dataset is used for the
instrumental variable approach in this chapter and is particularly key for the construction
of the instrument.
Data on mortality rates come from the Dartmouth Atlas Center.
4.4 Instrumental-Variables Approach
Consider a health production function given by:
D jt = αL
βl
jtK
βk
jt e
ε jt (48)
where D j is the health output generated by j in a given year t, in this case deaths per
100,000, L jt is the labor as number of physicians per 10,000, K jt is the capital (the quasi-
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fixed input), which is an index of hospitals in this case, and ε jt is an error term.
Taking the natural logarithm,
log
(
D jt
)
= α+βl log
(
L jt
)
+βk log
(
K jt
)
+ ε jt (49)
which we can rewrite as
d jt = α+βll jt+βkk jt+ ε jt (50)
where lowercase letters denote the logarithm.
Then, we utilize the standard textbook approach of an instrumental-variable GMM esti-
mation. Then βl , which is the parameter of interest, is estimated through the use of an
instrument Z jt . The instrument and its validity is further discussed in Section 4.5.
4.5 Estimation Strategy
I utilize my micro data on physicians’ transactions at the procedure level for Medicare to be
able to identify shocks that would affect the physician distribution while being exogenous
toward the health outcomes. The identifying assumption here is that the policy-part of
the reimbursement only shocks the distribution of physicians as areas that become more
remunerative are more attractive, but none of this variation is related to health outcomes. In
other words, an increase in an EKG rate and therefore the attractiveness of an area where
physicians can carry out more EKGs cannot be related to an increase in heart diseases.
Given the discussion in the previous Chapters, the policy-set fees are exogenous and not
based on changes in the underlying health of the population, supporting this assumption.
In order for this to hold, the policy-set rates have to be exogenous, otherwise other issues of
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endogeneity could be present. Reimbursement rates change for the whole nation according
to the decisions made by the reimbursement committee. Chapter 2 illustrates how the
variation in the procedures carried out by different specialty groups in different areas is the
key through which a policy-set fee affects the two specialty groups differently according to
the location they are in. The instrument is then equal to:
ZSPjt = ∑
i∈NSPj,t
∑
q∈treatments
Nq,SPi, j,t ∗ rvuqt
NSPj,t
(51)
ZPCjt = ∑
i∈NPCj,t
∑
q∈treatments
Nq,PCi, j,t ∗ rvuqt
NPCj,t
(52)
where Nkj,t is the total number of primary care physicians and specialists, respectively, in
HRR j in year t, Nq,ki, j,t is the number of services carried out by primary care physicians
and specialists, respectively, of procedure q in HRR j in year t, and rvuqj,t is the policy-
set reimbursement associated with procedure q in year t. In other words, the instruments
calculate an average value of policy-set reimbursement that a primary care physician or a
specialist, respectively, receives in HRR j in year t.
This instrument will be valid, relevant, and exogenous under the following restrictions:
1. There needs to be enough variation in the exogenous amount of reimbursement re-
ceived in different areas (i.e. ∑q∈treatments
(
Nq,SPi, j,t ∗ rvuqj,t
)
and∑q∈treatments
(
Nq,PCi, j,t ∗ rvuqj,t
)
are different for different j ).
This is easily respected because of the discussion in Chapter 2 and 3, where it is
clearly shown that reimbursement amounts vary greatly by location.
2. There needs to be enough variation in the mix of procedures carried out (i.e.
(
Nq,SPi, j,t
)
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Figure 4.8: Instrument Density by Urbanity Index
Notes: This figure shows the density distribution of the instrument created, across and within urbanity types. Source: CMS.
and
(
Nq,PCi, j,t
)
are different for different q across locations and people).
This is easily respected because of the discussion in Chapter 2, where it is clearly
shown that the types of procedures carried out vary a lot according to the location.
3. No procedure q is concentrated in one area only.
Therefore, I need to test the key identifying assumption that there is enough variation in
the policy-set part of the reimbursement carried out in different places and that these dif-
ferences in the reimbursement mix are uncorrelated with location unobservables that could
affect health. First, as shown in Figure 4.8, the instrument created displays high variation
across and within urbanity types.
Second, the exogeneity of the instrument could be challenged thinking that differences in
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Table 4.14: Performance of the instrument: test statistics
Test Statistic P-value
Conditional Likelihood Ratio 218.66 0.00
Anderson and Rubin 219.52 0.00
Lagrange Multiplier 218.57 0.00
Hansen’s J Test 0.95 0.33
First-Stage Results
Shea Partial R2 0.6901
Partial R2 0.6901
F(2, 1206) 1342.48
P-value 0.00
Notes: The table reports all the main statistics for tests to verify the validity of the instru-
ment. The instrument built performs well according to all tests considered.
the policy-set reimbursement received by physicians are correlated with the same charac-
teristics that affect the population’s health outcomes. First, as mentioned above, the fees
are set without relying on disease incidence and occurrence.
Instrument validity is supported by all tests. The first stage F-statistic is high and well above
Stock and Yogo values, suggesting that the instrument performs well in the prediction of
the physician distribution. The estimation passes the overidentification Hansen’s J-test as
well, with a p-value equal to 0.3295. The rule of thumb is that a high p-value indicates a
good model fit, and a p-value that is not too high suggests that there are no other issues
related to the model.
Table 4.14 summarizes all the test statistics.
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4.6 Results
The first results analyze the effect of a higher population of physicians on the mortality of
the population. All estimation is run with variables transformed in log values. Mortality
rates are per 100,000 residents, while physicians are per 10,000 residents, as commonly
done in the literature. The only proxy for capital is currently an index that measures the
presence of hospitals within the area. The results are first reported for the commonly-run
fixed-effects regression. If there is still bias in the coefficient on physician employment
due to endogeneity, we would expect the parameter to be biased upward (as discussed
beforehand) and therefore to be less negative. Once we run the instrumental regression
analysis, the parameter becomes more negative, as theory would suggest.
The results are also broken down to show the effect in an overall physician increase per
10,000 residents independently of the specialty group, and then reports the same parameters
for an increase in primary care physicians or specialists only. The parameters are very
similar, suggesting that an increase in either specialty group is not inherently different
from an increase in the other. This mirrors well the fact that physicians do different things
in different places, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, so that the health care supply to the
population is actually quite homogeneous across areas.
Table 4.15 reports the results of interest. Once we move from a fixed-effects to an instrumental-
variable regression analysis, the parameter of interest on the employment of physicians
becomes more negative, as theory would suggest. We will focus on the IV results for the
remainder of this discussion. The parameter of interest is the parameter on the physician
rate per 10,000 residents. The results reported suggest that a 1% increase in the number
of physicians per 10,000 residents leads to a 0.19% reduction in the mortality rate per
100,000. To put this into perspective, a 1% increase in the physician rate per 10,000 res-
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idents is equivalent to an average increase of slightly less than two physicians (1.94 extra
physicians per 10,000 residents on average). A decrease of 0.19% in the mortality rate per
100,000 is equivalent to, on average, 9 fewer deaths per 100,000. Therefore, on average,
the effect estimated by the IV regression is that one more physician per 10,000 residents
saves about 4.5 people every 100,000 residents.
The range of a 1% physician increase per 10,000 residents is equivalent to a range between
<1 to 7.5 more physicians. The 0.19% decrease in the mortality rate per 100,000 residents
is equivalent to a range between 6 and 11 people saved per 100,000.
The other coefficients are reasonable. The sickness of patients controls for the general
sickness of the population, which increases the mortality rate, the higher it is. The hospital
index is positive, which mirrors the fact that sick patients concentrate close to hospitals.
The IV regression attenuates that effect, though, decreasing the coefficient to almost zero.
Further research can focus on the estimation of the capital coefficient.
4.7 Conclusion
The impact of the physician workforce on health is a topic that has been analyzed for
decades, with studies that have asserted a clear correlation between a higher number of
physicians per capita and better health outcomes, which have been cited by policymakers
and the media as empirical evidence of a causal relationship between a larger physician
workforce and a healthier population. This chapter approached this issue by building a
novel instrument using policy-set fees and the high variation in the procedures carried out
to estimate that a physician saves, on average, 4.5 lives per 100,000 residents. This chapter
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Table 4.15: Aggregate data: Fixed-effects and instrumental-variable analyses
Fixed Effects Instrumental Variables
All Physicians
Physicians per 10,000 -0.08 -0.19
(0.02) (0.01)
Sickness of patients 0.09 0.29
(0.03) (0.03)
Hospital index 0.50 0.005
(0.04) (0.002)
Primary Care Physicians
Physicians per 10,000 -0.05 -0.19
(0.02) (0.02)
Sickness of patients for primary care -0.03 0.24
(0.03) (0.03)
Hospital index 0.46 0.005
(0.05) (0.002)
Specialists
Physicians per 10,000 -0.08 -0.19
(0.02) (0.01)
Sickness of patients for specialty care 0.10 0.29
(0.03) (0.03)
Hospital index 0.50 0.004
(0.04) (0.002)
Notes: The table reports the results from the instrumental-variable approach compared to the fixed-
effects regression analysis. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the mortality rate per
100,000 residents. All regressors are the natural logarithm of the variables. Standard errors in paren-
theses.
used hospital referral regions (HRRs) as the definition of health markets. HRRs are defined
by the Dartmouth Atlas Center as the closest proxy to a medical market, meaning that
patients that live within an HRR tend to receive care within the HRR the majority of the
time. This chapter also accounted for the geographical differences in age, gender, and
race across the population, as not doing so would also lead to bias in the coefficients. To
understand the impact of physicians on the mortality rate, this chapter therefore utilized an
age-race-gender adjusted mortality rate in the analysis.
107
The results shown in this chapter suggest that those reported in previous studies through a
cross-sectional analysis with a few area-level controls display a large upward bias, which
is typical of linear regression analyses where endogeneity is present. The results of this
chapter are about 1/10 of the physician workforce effect on health estimated by previous
studies. All tests on the instrument provide evidence that the instrument performs well and
is exogenous to the mortality rate of the area. One more issue remain to be addressed, how-
ever: are the 4.5 lives saved because of access to a greater workforce or because of a better
workforce overall? Future research needs to address this important, yet often overlooked,
point.
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A.8 Institutional Framework
Figure A.1: Medical CPI vs. All CPI
Notes: This figure shows the Consumer Pricing Index for all goods vs. only medical goods. The growth of
CPI for medical goods changed dramatically both following the birth of Medicare in 1967 and the birth of
the Resource-Based Relative Value Unit System in 1992. Source: CMS.
As shown in Figure A.1, the increase in health expenditure has been long-lasting, with
a clear increase in its growth since the 80s. The first full year under Medicare coverage
(1967) clearly led to an increase in medical costs.
The 1992 fee-for-service system is called the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS).
The system was based on some initial rates and geographical adjustment factors, which
would be reviewed on an annual basis by the RVS Update Committee (RUC). The RUC
was meant to only have an advisory role, but its recommendations are accepted 97% of the
time, making it de facto the fee-setting organization.
The Reader should bear in mind that the fee-for-service system is not new to 1992. The
system before, the Usual, Customary, and Reasonable (UCR) system, was still based on
a fee-for-service reimbursement; however, these reimbursements were not standardized
across doctors and tractability was not possible also due to lack of information on individual
pricing. This is what prompted discussions at the beginning of 1990 to reform it. This paper
shows that the new pricing system exacerbated the issue, leading to a change in doctors’
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decision making. Moreover, it allows the researcher to be able to estimate the impact of this
pricing on physicians’ choices due to the fee standardization (and its availability publicly).
For each procedure j in market t, the reimbursement is equal to:
Reimbursement jt =Constantt ∗RVU jt ∗GAFt (53)
The constant only depends on the year and is equal across specialties and procedures. The
relative value units change according to the procedure as well as the year, and the geo-
graphic adjustment factors (GAFs) depend on the market (area and year).
The constant, called the Conversion Factor (CF), is a national adjustment factor, which is
identical across specialties, areas, and procedures. The 2017 CF is equal to $35.8887. The
GAFs are a proxy for cost of living, adjusting for differences in input costs across payment
regions.
The RUC’s recommendations across the years have been constantly widening the gap be-
tween the procedure reimbursements usually carried out by specialists and those regularly
carried out by primary care.
Since the reimbursement does not depend on who carries out the procedure, but only on the
procedure itself, and specialty procedures are more highly priced than typical primary care
procedures, this payment system generates financial incentives for primary care physicians
to substitute to more specialized, remunerative procedures when possible.
A.9 Standard Multinomial Logit Demand
This section presents what the model would look like if it was simplified to a standard
multinomial logit model of demand.
I assume the household to face the following utility function when buying product j in
market t:
ui jt = x jtβ +λRVU jt−α p jt+ εi jt εi jt iid∼T1EV
δ jt = x jtβ +λRVU jt−α p jt
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Markets, products, and characteristics are the same as in Section 5.
The simple logit demand assumes all individuals to be identical. Then, the market share of
product j is equal to the probability that product j yields the highest utility, which happens
if the ε disturbance of product j is high enough with respect to the alternatives:
s jt = Pr
(
x jtβ +λRVU jt−α p jt+ εi jt
)
>Pr (xktβ +λRVUkt−α pkt+ εikt) ∀k 6= j (54)
Thanks to the properties of the type-1 extreme value distribution, this reduces to the share
of product j being equal to:
s jt =
exp
{
x jtβ +λRVU jt−α p jt
}
1+∑1175k=1 exp{xktβ +λRVUkt−α pkt}
(55)
To estimate this demand, notice that:
log
(
s jt
s0t
)
=
log(s jt)− log(s0t) = log
(
exp
{
x jtβ +λRVU jt −α p jt
}
1+∑1175k=1 exp{xktβ +λRVUkt −α pkt}
)
− log
(
exp{0}
1+∑1175k=1 exp{xktβ +λRVUkt −α pkt}
)
log(s jt)− log(s0t) = log
(
exp
{
x jtβ +λRVU jt −α p jt
})
− log
(
1+
1175
∑
k=1
exp{xktβ +λRVUkt −α pkt}
)
− log(exp{0})+ log
(
1+
1175
∑
k=1
exp{xktβ +λRVUkt −α pkt}
)
log(s jt)− log(s0t) = log
(
exp
{
x jtβ +λRVU jt −α p jt
})− log(1)
log(s jt)− log(s0t) = x jtβ +λRVU jt −α p jt
As I mentioned before, even though I expect the price to be exogenous, I still use an instru-
mental variable approach. The instruments are the same as the ones presented in the body
of the text.
A.10 Model-Implied Marginal Cost Regression on Input Costs
Table A.1 shows the results from a regression of the instruments discussed in Section 2.6
on price. The instruments explain about 54% of the price variance with highly significant
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Table A.1: OLS Regression of Price on Chosen Instruments
Variables y = Price
Procedure GAF 840.80
(52.15)
Practice Expense GAF -82.06
(23.40)
Malpractice GAF 13.18
(5.59)
Malpractice Reimbursement 748.50
(1.83)
Constant -677.70
(49.00)
Observations 142,112
R2 0.54
Notes: This table shows the coefficients obtained by regressing price on the
chosen instrumental variables. Standard errors in parentheses.
coefficients.
The marginal costs can be backed out from the estimates of the model. Table A.2 shows
the results from a regression of the marginal costs implied by the model on the instrumental
variables chosen for a random market, i.e., rural Kansas. Marginal costs are well fitted by
the instrumental variables representing input costs, with an R2 equal to 0.74.
A.11 Robustness of Reimbursement Effect on Probability
Table A.3 shows the results from the logistic regression as explained in Section 2.6 on a
widened range of procedures, carried out by specialists 50 to 80% of the time, and by pri-
mary care physicians the remainder of the time. The positive effect of the reimbursement
rate is consistent. The increase in the probability of providing specialty procedures, inde-
pendently of the number of services provided, is about the same as before. Once I include
frequency weights, the probability is about half. This is due to the fact that I am now in-
cluding many procedures that are generally provided by primary care physicians to begin
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Table A.2: Regression of Marginal Costs on Cost Shifters, Rural Kansas
Variables (1) (2)
Work GAF 774.20 766.19
(1.68) (1.66)
Practice GAF -72.10 -71.67
(1.74) (1.73)
Malpractice Insurance GAF 0.07 0.07
(1.40) (1.39)
Work GAF2 -417.51 -413.38
(1.69) (1.66)
Malpractice Insurance 0.42 0.42
(13.71) (13.67)
Malpractice Insurance2 -0.04 -0.04
(6.81) (6.80)
Work GAF*Practice GAF 71.53 71.12
(1.74) (1.73)
Random Error -0.004
(0.44)
Constant -353.80 -349.93
(1.65) (1.63)
R2 0.74 0.75
Observations 272 272
Notes: Exemplary results for one market. Marginal costs estimated are regressed on
the instrumental variables used in the paper, showing a good fit of cost variance. T-
Statistics in parentheses.
with, so that these procedures are more homogeneously carried out across the physician
population.
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Table A.3: Logit: y=1 if primary care physicians increase the number of specialty proce-
dures carried out - 20-50%
Variables (1) (2)
Change in Procedure Reimbursement 0.14 0.21
(0.02) (0.003)
Change in Malpractice Reimbursement -0.62 -2.00
(0.03) (0.01)
Change in Practice Reimbursement 0.02 0.50
(0.01) (0.001)
Change in Procedure GAF 10.30 32.83
(1.40) (0.15)
Change in Malpractice GAF -0.003 0.17
(0.02) (0.002)
Change in Practice GAF -2.64 -7.34
(0.56) (0.06)
Constant 1.77 2.58
(0.003) (0.0003)
Frequency Weights NO YES
Observations 2,304,888 2,304,888
Notes: Logistic regression of variables of interest on whether or not primary care increases the specialty
procedures provided, with and without frequency weights. The procedures included are those that are
carried out by primary care physicians, on average, between 20 and 50% of times as suggested by the
specialization index previously discussed. Year dummies are included. Standard errors in parentheses.
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B.12 Preference for Retention
Table 9 reports the results for physicians’ preferences for retention. Physicians display a
preference for locations that are close to where they completed their residency. Therefore,
preferences of workers with the same demographic characteristics ` for a HRR j can differ
due to preferences to remain within the residency’s HRR and state. This is motivated by
two facts in the health literature: first, many physicians that want to return to their state of
birth tend to pick a residency that already fulfills their preference, so this preference also
proxies for a preference to return to the birthplace; secondly, many medical students initiate
personal relationships during residency that lead to their choice of remaining close to their
residency location (often due to the fact that their spouse is not in the medical profession,
for example). These two facts lead to a third, widely discussed fact: many states display
high rates of residency retention, with 54% of all residents in the US remaining within
their state of residency for their first job. My data sample replicates this fact, with 51.4%
of doctors picking to remain within the same state of residency.
Table B.1: Physician Supply: Preferences for Retention (β k,`state, β
k,`
HRR)
State State, Top 50 HRR HRR, Top 50
PC SP PC SP PC SP PC SP
2012 2.17 1.84 0.65 -0.32 2.79 2.11 -1.38 -0.26
(0.08) (0.06) (0.41) (0.12) (0.09) (0.06) (0.50) (0.13)
2013 2.14 1.56 0.52 -0.53 2.83 2.02 0.13 -0.14
(0.08) (0.06) (0.42) (0.15) (0.09) (0.07) (0.70) (0.16)
2014 2.54 1.60 -1.02 -0.59 2.81 2.10 0.58 -0.23
(0.07) (0.06) (0.35) (0.14) (0.08) (0.07) (0.45) (0.15)
2015 2.63 1.75 -0.33 -0.31 2.78 2.01 -0.67 -0.60
(0.08) (0.06) (0.29) (0.14) (0.09) (0.07) (0.40) (0.16)
2016 2.59 1.79 0.72 -0.45 3.10 2.10 -0.95 -0.43
(0.08) (0.06) (0.42) (0.13) (0.09) (0.07) (0.45) (0.15)
Notes: These results come from the physician supply analysis described in the paper. Magnitude represents the
semielasticity of demand with respect to whether the choice is within the same state or area (HRR) of residency,
respectively. The coefficients are obtained through maximum likelihood estimation of the conditional logit model
based on individual-level data on residency and choice locations. The sample includes all residents finishing
residency, by specialty, between 2012 and 2016. The choice set is given by the set of hospital referral regions in
the United States as defined by Dartmouth Atlas.
Table 9 shows the estimates from the maximum likelihood estimation of the conditional
logit model displaying the semi-elasticity of demand with respect to whether or not the
choice is within the same state of residency first, and within the same hospital referral
region after. The first two columns report the results for state of residency, while the second
two columns report the results for state of residency. I find that primary care physicians are
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about 3.5 times more likely to pick a job within the same state of residency and about 4
times more likely to pick a job within the same hospital referral region as the residency.
On the other hand, specialists are 2.5 times more likely to pick a job within the same state
as residency and about 3 times more likely to pick a job within the same hospital referral
region. Further checks reject that retention values can be the same between primary care
physicians and specialists.
The retention value of staying within the same hospital referral region displays an increase
of 11% in the last five years, suggesting that primary care physicians value retention more
and more. The value of staying within the same state for primary care physicians has also
displayed an increase over the panel period analyzed, by a little over 19%. Specialists’
preference to stay within the same state as residency has remained fairly constant across
the panel.
I compare the base estimates with those of individuals that attended a top-50 residency.
These last estimates seem to be more noisy, due to the small selected sample. I cannot
conclude that top-50 primary care residents have a different value to remain within the
same state of residency, but top-50 primary care residents have a lower value to remain
within the same hospital referral region. Top-50 specialty residents display a lower value
of retention, and they are about 1-1.5 times less likely to be retained at the hospital referral
region- and state-level, across all years.
Finally, I find extremely high estimates of retention of physicians that completed their
residency rurally. Due to the small sample problem, the standard errors are not reliable
for yearly estimates. I therefore look at the sample as a whole and find that rural residents
are at least one time more likely to be retained. Since that is estimated using the whole
sample across years, I consider this to be a lower bound on the retention preference for
rural residents.
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B.13 Unobserved Amenities
From the results obtained paper, I can quickly solve for the implied unobserved preferences
for the different job locations. I can then look at whether the unobserved amenities for
primary care physicians are related to the unobserved amenities for specialists. Table 10
presents these estimates.
Table B.2: Unobserved Amenities Implied by the Model
∆Unobserved Amenities, Primary Care
∆Unobserved Amenities, Specialists 0.33
Constant 0.26
R2 0.16
Notes: The regression uses the unobserved characteristics backed up from the model of physician supply.
Changes in the specialists’ utility value of unobserved characteristics are correlated with changes in the primary
care physicians’ value for the same location.
The specialists’ utility value of changes in unobserved amenities is positively correlated
with the primary care physicians’ utility value of changes in unobserved amenities for the
same location. The variation explained is about 16%. While this is not too high, there are
many things that specialists could value more than primary care physicians, such as the
presence of hospitals at close proximity, where specialists often have an office and perform
procedures.
To see whether the estimations make sense, I rank the locations based on the unobserved
amenities for primary care physicians and specialists.
I find that the top locations for unobservables for specialists are: Houston, New York,
Miami, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Dallas. All of these are big cities with a high concentration of
hospitals and are well-known as desirable locations, reinforcing the validity of the results.
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B.14 Evolution of Welfare Differences between Primary Care Physi-
cians and Specialists
The wage differential as well as the reimbursement differential between primary care physi-
cians and specialists has been increasing over time. The differences are calculated using log
hourly wages for specialists and primary care and the average is taken across all hospital re-
ferral regions for every year. The increase in the wage gap between primary care physicians
and specialists in the past 5 years has been equal to 0.037 log units (over $1/hour).
I calculate the welfare as follows:
Welfarekt = log
(
∑
j
exp
(
δ k, `jt +β
k, `
j xi jt+ εi jt
))
(56)
I then measure the physician’s willingness to pay (in log wages) to pick his first choice
counterfactual hospital referral region instead of his first choice hospital referral region in
2012. I look at the expected utility change driven by different factors and calculate the
average welfare gap between specialists and primary care physicians resulting from such
differences.
In particular the change in the welfare gap between specialists and primary care physicians
in year t is given by the following:
∆Welfare Gapt =
(
WelfareSPt −WelfarePCt
)
−
(
WelfareSP2012−WelfarePC2012
)
+
(
wSP2012−wPC2012
)
+
(
reimbSP2012− reimbPC2012
)
(57)
The results from the four different welfare gap analyses (total compensation, total compen-
sation with rents and amenities, and all factors) are reported in Table 11. I find that only
considering the wage gap represents well the welfare gap caused by differences in the total
compensation between specialists and primary care physicians. However, once everything
else is taken into account (rent, amenities), the wage gap alone only captures a fifteenth of
the welfare gap between the two physician groups.
I then calculate the same gap by analyzing the differences along the urbanity index, differ-
entiating among big cities, small cities, and rural areas. The current wage gap is highest
in big cities, at 0.097, as expected, since physicians are compensated more in places with
lower amenities.
Once the geographical differences are taken into consideration, I find that considering only
the compensation dramatically understates the welfare gap between the two types of physi-
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Table B.3: Welfare Decomposition: All Locations
∆Compensation ∆Compensation, Rent, Amenities ∆All
2012 1.36 1.36 1.36
2013 1.36 1.26 2.11
2014 1.24 1.09 2.31
2015 1.31 1.24 2.09
2016 1.40 1.51 1.93
∆2016-2012 0.04 0.15 0.57
∆Welfare Gap
∆Wage Gap 1.10 4.16 15.48
Notes: These results come from the welfare analysis described in the paper. I measure the physician’s willingness to pay (in log
wages) to pick his first choice counterfactual location instead of his first choice location in 2012. I then analyze the expected utility
change driven by different factors and calculate the average welfare gap between specialists and primary care physicians in the
different environments. The choice set is given by the set of hospital referral regions in the United States as defined by Dartmouth
Atlas. I account for the initial wage gap, reimbursement gap, and reimbursement rate gap observed in the data. The initial wage
gap between primary care physicians and specialists in the past 5 years is equal to 0.037 log units (over $1/hour). More details on
the estimation are available in the text.
cians rurally. Compensation alone is not a good proxy of the welfare gap due to the higher
wages that make up for lost amenities. All results from the decomposition by geographical
area are reported in Tables 12 through 14.
Table B.4: Welfare Decomposition by Location Urbanity: Compensation
∆Compensation All City Small City Rural
2012 1.36 1.16 1.41 1.43
2013 1.36 1.18 1.38 1.38
2014 1.24 1.11 1.36 1.10
2015 1.31 1.17 1.36 1.29
2016 1.40 1.19 1.47 1.40
∆2016-2012 0.04 0.03 0.06 -0.03
∆Welfare Gap
∆Wage Gap 1.10 0.30 3.00 -1.11
Notes: These results come from the welfare analysis described in the paper. I measure the physician’s
willingness to pay (in log wages) to pick his first choice counterfactual location instead of his first choice
location in 2012. I then analyze the expected utility change driven by changes in compensation and
calculate the average welfare gap between specialists and primary care physicians along the urbanity
index. The choice set is given by the set of hospital referral regions in the United States as defined by
Dartmouth Atlas. I account for the initial wage gap, reimbursement gap, and reimbursement rate gap
observed in the data. The initial wage gap between primary care physicians and specialists in the past 5
years is equal to 0.097 log units in cities, 0.020 log units in small cities, and 0.028 log units in rural areas.
More details on the estimation are available in the text.
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Table B.5: Welfare Decomposition by Location Urbanity: Compensation, Rent, Amenities
∆Compensation, Rent, Amenities All City Small City Rural
2012 1.36 1.16 1.41 1.43
2013 1.26 1.12 1.28 1.24
2014 1.09 1.07 1.43 0.84
2015 1.24 1.28 1.28 1.30
2016 1.51 1.39 1.53 1.38
∆2016-2012 0.15 0.22 0.12 -0.05
∆Welfare Gap
∆Wage Gap 4.16 2.29 6.05 -1.78
Notes: These results come from the welfare analysis described in the paper. I measure the physician’s willingness to pay (in
log wages) to pick his first choice counterfactual location instead of his first choice location in 2012. I then analyze the expected
utility change driven by changes in compensation, rent, and amenities and calculate the average welfare gap between specialists
and primary care physicians along the urbanity index. The choice set is given by the set of hospital referral regions in the United
States as defined by Dartmouth Atlas. I account for the initial wage gap, reimbursement gap, and reimbursement rate gap observed
in the data. The initial wage gap between primary care physicians and specialists in the past 5 years is equal to 0.097 log units in
cities, 0.020 log units in small cities, and 0.028 log units in rural areas. More details on the estimation are available in the text.
Table B.6: Welfare Decomposition by Location Urbanity: All Factors
∆Compensation, Rent, Amenities All City Small City Rural
2012 1.36 1.16 1.41 1.43
2013 2.11 1.91 2.16 2.19
2014 2.31 2.12 2.37 2.37
2015 2.09 1.89 2.15 2.18
2016 1.93 1.73 1.98 2.03
∆2016-2012 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.60
∆Welfare Gap
∆Wage Gap 15.48 5.87 28.58 21.50
Notes: These results come from the welfare analysis described in the paper. I measure the physician’s willingness to pay (in log
wages) to pick his first choice counterfactual location instead of his first choice location in 2012. I then analyze the expected utility
change driven by the intertemporal changes in the different factors and calculate the average welfare gap between specialists and
primary care physicians along the urbanity index. The choice set is given by the set of hospital referral regions in the United States
as defined by Dartmouth Atlas. I account for the initial wage gap, reimbursement gap, and reimbursement rate gap observed in the
data. The initial wage gap between primary care physicians and specialists in the past 5 years is equal to 0.097 log units in cities,
0.020 log units in small cities, and 0.028 log units in rural areas. More details on the estimation are available in the text.
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